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A project manager, contract administrator, or owner's
representative (all terms often used to refer to the owner's
representative) is usually involved in several of the many stages
of a project. Some of the different stages include: project
design, bidding, contract award, contract administration while
project in under construction, and claims resolution.
In order for the owner's representative to successfully
represent the owner and manage the project, he should be aware of
some of the problems and pitfalls that may be encountered and be
prepared to effectively deal with them. This paper will look at
problems caused by fraudulent and unethical conduct and will
concentrate on federal government construction contracts. Signs
and indicators of fraud will be discussed as well as methods of




Each year billions of dollars are spent on construction in the
United States 1 , with a substantial portion funded by public money
(federal, state, and local taxes).
It seems that whenever large sums of money are at stake, a
small percentage of people will devise unethical and/or fraudulent
schemes in an attempt to acquire a share of the money. Unethical
and fraudulent practices increase the cost of construction with
some estimates of increased costs as high as 15 percent. Some of
the most common unethical and fraudulent practices occurring in the
construction industry will be discussed in this paper.
Construction contracting has evolved over the years and has
its own set of rules and regulations. Some of the rules and
regulations are spelled out in the form of a contract. Others are
established by federal, state, and local regulations.
The federal acquisition regulation (FAR) is the source of most
of the procurement and contracting regulations that govern federal
construction contracts and will be referenced frequently throughout
this paper. Some trade and professional societies publish codes
of ethics which are attempts to set standards of behavior for their
members. Ethics can be defined as the discipline dealing with what
is good and bad and with moral duty and obligation. It is also the
principles of conduct governing an individual or a group. Fraud
in government contracts can be defined as willful or conscious
wrong doing that adversely affects government interest. Fraud
includes but is not limited to: 3

2a) Falsification of documents.
b) Charging personal expenses to government contracts (Cost type
of contracts)
.
c) Division of government property or funds for unauthorized
uses.
d) False claims.
e) False allocation of contract costs (Cost type of contracts)
.




j) Conflict of interest.
k) Gratuities.
1) Anti-trust violation.
m) Intentional delivery of inferior goods/ buy american
violation.
n) Kick Backs.
If a contractor has committed fraud he has certainly acted
unethically. But conversely all unethical acts are not considered
fraud. For example: A contractor who furnishes his workers old
worn out safety equipment is not acting in the best interest of his
employees (not fulfilling moral obligation) . If an accident were
to occur as a result of the safety equipment, it is likely that
investigations would be made by various regulatory safety agencies
but it is not likely that the contractor has committed fraud. On
the other hand if the contractor was required by law to maintain

3proper safety equipment and keep detailed records of maintenance
performed, and willingly falsified maintenance records he would
probably be prosecuted for fraud. In order to understand unethical
and fraudulent practices it is helpful to know what each party's
rights and responsibilities are to the other. These rights and
responsibilities will be discussed throughout this paper along with
the ways in which one of the parties may violate them.
Key steps in eliminating unethical and fraudulent practices
include: understanding the practices, recognizing the warning
signs and indicators of such practices, and knowing how to
effectively deal with such practices once they are discovered.
In the case of publicly funded projects, the public has placed
their trust in those officials charged with administering the
projects and has a right to expect that their money will not be
wasted through unethical or fraudulent practices from either the
agency administrating the contract (owner) or the contractor.
It is the aim of this paper that both public and private
owners as well as contractors become more aware of the unethical
and fraudulent practices that plague the construction industry.
Through this awareness owners and contractors can become better
educated and suited to respond to these practices.
1.1 Government Contracting as a Socio-Economic Activity
Most construction projects or programs have as an end goal a
quality facility that is built on time, within budget, and serves
the need of the owner or user occupying the facility. The
contractor is monetarily compensated in return for his ability to

4meet these goals. Government contracting (federal and most other
forms of government) is a socio-economic program.
In general, the goal of socio-economic programs is to provide
social benefit to some select portion of the population by economic
means. The population that is to benefit is selected by those
officials in charge of making the contracting regulations and laws
in this country; or in other words it is a political process. This
population that is often selected because it is felt that by
helping a specific group the government and hence the people as a
whole would benefit. Examples of such socio-economic programs in
federal contracting are the minority and small business contracting
policies (discussed in chapter 10) , the buy american act (discussed
in chapter 5) , and various labor laws that are specific to federal
construction contracts (discussed in chapter 9) . The enforcement
of these socio-economic programs places and additional
administrative burden on the contracting agency and adds another
dimension to construction contracting.

5CHAPTER 2 : CONTRACT AWARD
2.1 Contracting
Most government construction contracts are awarded using
sealed bids on a fixed price basis. Sealed bidding is a method of
bidding in which all contractors submit their bids to the
contracting agency in a sealed envelope. Fixed price contracts
are those in which the contractor performs all of the work
described in the contract drawings and specifications for a fixed
sum of money. This sum of money would only be increased by a
change order for additional work or changed circumstances (see
chapter 6)
.
Two notable exceptions to this type of contract are the set aside
contracts (see chapter 10 ), and cost plus incentive fee contracts.
2.2 Sealed Bidding
Fixed price sealed bidding contracts are most appropriate when
the reguirements are well known and can be described in the
technical specifications and drawings. It is also required that
fixed price contracts be used when using the sealed bidding
4
method. Fixed price sealed bidding consists of the following
actions:
1) Contract documents are prepared.
2) The contract is advertised for bidding.
3) Bids are received (lump sum for work described)
.
4) Bids are opened.
5) Bids are evaluated.
6) Contract is awarded.

6An invitation for bids package (IFB) is prepared for each contract.
The IFB contains all of the contract documents including the
drawings, technical specifications, and instructions and forms for
submitting bids. Contractors who have placed their names on a
prospective bidders list in the contracting office are sent notices
about the project scope and time and location that the IFB package
is available. Contractors can receive IFB packages by contacting
the contracting office responsible for administering the contract.
The solicitation for bids is also reguired to be advertised in the
Commerce Business Daily (CBD) for any contract over $25,000. A
minimum of 30 days is reguired between the time that a solicitation
for bids appears in the CBD and the opening of bids. This time is
to permit all bidders that are interested the necessary time to bid
on the project. Bids are opened at the time and location stated
7 . .in the IFB package. All bids that are not of a classified nature
(vast majority of government construction contracts) are opened
publicly and read aloud to the persons present, and then recorded.
The bids are open to public inspection after the bid opening. The
•k
award must be made to the responsible bidder who submitted the
k
lowest responsive bid, unless there is a compelling reason to
Q
cancel the invitation. Reasons to cancel the invitation include:
1) Inadeguate or ambiguous specifications were cited in the IFB.
2) Specification has been revised.
3) The services being contracted for are no longer reguired.
4) All otherwise acceptable bids received are at unreasonable
prices, or only one bid is received and the contracting officer

7cannot determine the reasonableness of the bid price, or no
responsive bid has been received from a responsible bidder.
5) The bids were not independently arrived at in open
competition, were collusive, or were submitted in bad faith.
6) For other reasons, cancellation is clearly in the public's
interest ( this reason usually requires approval from the head
of the contracting agency)
.
All reasons for canceling an IFB must be properly documented.
Most owners use some form of sealed bidding fixed price
contracts as it is the easiest type of contracting. The sealed
bidding process is open to public scrutiny in federal construction
contracts; this may not be the case for private owners using sealed
bidding. Opportunities for tampering in the bidding process do
exist.
2.3 Safeguards Against Tampering
In government construction contracts, all bids that are
received before the time bids are due are placed in a locked bid
9box or safe. Typically only limited personnel have access to the
bid box. Any bids received by the government after the time set
for bid opening are considered late bids. Late bids are not
10
acceptable unless:
1) The bid is received before the contract is awarded and
a) It was sent to the contracting office by registered or
certified mail no later that five calendar days before the
bid opening date or,
b) It was sent by mail or telegram and it is determined that

8the late receipt was due solely to mishandling by the
government or,
c) It was sent to the contracting office by U. S. Postal
service express mail next day service not later that two
working days prior to the date specified for receipt of
bids. 10
The above rules eliminate the potential for anyone standing
in the vicinity of the bid opening area that may overhear the
results to rush in with a bid that has just been prepared. In
arriving at the low responsive responsible bidder some bids may be
rejected by the government. The following are reasons for
rejecting bids:
1) Failing to conform to the essential requirements of the IFB.
2) When a bidder imposes conditions that would modify
requirements of the invitation or limit the bidder's liability
to the government.
All bidders must bid on performing the work as described in the
1
1
IFB. To allow any exceptions would be unfair to other bidders.
After bids are opened, the contracting officer examines the
bids for mistakes. If the contracting officer suspects that the
low bidder has made a mistake, the contracting officer will
contact the low bidder and ask him to verify the bid calling
12
attention to the suspected mistake.
Apparent clerical mistakes on the face of the bid may be
corrected. Some examples include obvious misplacement of a decimal
point, and obvious incorrect discounts (1 percent discount for

913payment in 10 days, 2 percent discount for payment in 2 days
The authority to correct bid mistakes is limited to bids, that as
submitted, are responsive to the invitation and may not be used to
permit correction of bids to make them responsive.
Bid mistakes may be corrected if the bidder shows clear and
convincing evidence of the mistake and the actual intended bid.
This correction may not displace the already established low bidder
unless the existence of the mistake and the actually intended bid
are ascertainable from the invitation and the bid itself.
A low bidder that claims a mistake may be permitted to
withdraw his bid if the evidence is clear and convincing both as
to the existence of a mistake and as to the actually intended bid,
and the bid as corrected would no longer be the low bid. If the
corrected bid would still remain the low bid, the contracting
officer may correct the bid and not permit its withdrawal. The
author has not seen the latter occur. There seems to be a desire
not to force a contract upon a contractor who from the very
beginning does not want to perform the work, although, the
contractor may lose his posted bid bond if he refuses to perform
the contract. Allowing a contractor to simply withdraw his bid for
unsubstantiated reasons may encourage bid rigging as discussed in
chapter 3 . A contractor who is the low bidder by a large margin
could be approached by the next lowest bidder and be offered a
kickback to withdraw his bid.
Some contractors after seeing the results of the bid opening
may grow concerned that as the low bidder they are far below other
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bidders and recalculate their estimate looking for errors. Other
contractors may see that their bid is far lower than the other bids
and that a large sum of money has been "left on the table." Under
these circumstances, some contractors are apt to claim they made
a bid mistake and try to reclaim some of the money. It is here
where the contracting officer must be careful to ascertain that the
contractor has presented "clear and convincing evidence" that a
mistake has occurred. It is not fair to the other bidders that
this contractor has a second chance at bidding but they are not
allowed to correct their bids downwards for a second chance. The
contractor is somewhat being rewarded for sloppiness in preparing
his bid.
In a recent contract for housing renovations at the Naval
Academy, bids were received from several contractors. The low bid
was approximately $ 2.7 million and was more than $ 1 million
below the next low bidder. The low bidder claimed that he made an
error and did not multiply his carpentry costs of approximately $
3000 per housing unit by the total number of units but only added
it once. The low bidder submitted his bid estimate sheets filled
out in pencil to the contracting officer as evidence that a mistake
was made. The contracting agency determined that the evidence was
sufficient to permit the correction and awarded the contract. The
second low bidder filed a protest about the decision and the
protest was sent to the General Accounting Office (GAO) to decide.
GAO decided to let the award stand. Allowing correction of bid
mistakes forgives contractors who are sloppy in preparing estimates
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and may encourage contractors to fabricate errors after learning
that "money has been left on the table." The government adjusted
the contractor's bid price upwards around $3 00,000 but this amount
was still over $ 700,000 below the next bidder. Careful
consideration must be given to the decision to allow a correction
to be made. The fact that the government is saving over $ 700,000
should not enter the decision as whether to allow the low bidder
to correct his bid.
The contracting officer has the obligation to notify the low
bidder if the contracting officer suspects a mistake in the bid and
ask the bidder to verify the bid as being correct. A bid that is
far below the other bids or the government estimate is suspect for
14
containing an error.
If after a contract is awarded, the contractor claims a
mistake, the mistake may be corrected by contract amendment, if
correcting the mistake would be favorable to the government (ie
lowering the price) . However, it is unclear why any contractor
who is the low bidder and has won by fair competition would do
this. The contracting officer may rescind the contract, delete
items involved in the mistake, or increase the price of the
contract provided the price does not exceed that of the next lowest
acceptable bidder. The above corrections can only be made if the
it
mistake is a mutual mistake , or the mistake was so obvious that
the contracting officer should have noticed it.
After the contract is awarded, all unsuccessful bidders are
15




in the CBD is made of all awards over $ 2 5,000.
2.4 Cost Plus Award Fee Contracts
The cost plus award fee contract is a type of cost
reimbursement contract in which the contractor is paid his
allowable incurred costs (see chapter 6) up to a certain pre-
established ceiling. This type of contract establishes an estimate
of the total cost. The contract provides a fee that consists of
two parts:
1) A base fee (typically around 3 percent of the initial project
estimate) and,
2) An award amount that is based upon the contractor's
performance.
The contractor's performance is evaluated periodically and
part of the award fee may be paid to the contractor at each
evaluation. Criteria for evaluating performance of the contractor
are set forth in the contract and may include his ability to
control costs as related to the initial estimate. Periodic
evaluations will give the contractor incentive to maintain superior
performance or improve performance in anticipation of earning the
award fee.
2.4a Use of Cost Plus Award Fee Contracts
This type of contract is used when the scope of work is not
adequately defined to permit costs to be estimated with sufficient
accuracy to use a fixed price contract. It would be unrealistic
to expect a contractor to assume the risk of performing an unknown
task at a fixed price. An example of the use of this type of

13
contract would be the emergency repairs of a facility after a
hurricane.
17This type of contract can only be used when:
1) The contractor's accounting system is adequate for
determining costs applicable to the contract.
2) Government surveillance during performance will ensure that
efficient methods and effective cost controls are used.
3) It is impractical to obtain the desired service without the
use of this kind of contract.
This type of contract is not awarded by using sealed bids since
adequate technical specifications often do not exist.
2.4b Award of Cost Plus Award Fee Contracts
Any contract awarded by a method other than sealed bidding is
referred to as contracting by negotiation. Negotiation may or may
not involve competition. Competition is required in all contracts
18
with the following limited exceptions:
1) Only one responsible source and no other supplies or services
will satisfy agency requirements (not likely to be the case for
construction contracts)
.
2) Unusual and compelling urgency (lack of proper planning is
not an excuse for foregoing competition)
.
3) Authorized or required by statute (8a proqram falls into this
category, see chapter 10 )
.
4) National security, limited competition is authorized if the




5) Public interest, the authority to use this justification is
limited to agency heads (Secretary of the Army, Secretary of the
Navy, Secretary of Transportation, etc.).
All reasons for limiting competition must be documented.
Since detailed specifications do not exist, the government
solicitation will list the basic requirement of the contract and
the evaluation criteria used in selecting a contractor. For
example, the basic requirement may be the clean up of debris after
a hurricane and repairs to roofs of a certain number of buildings.
The requirement would not state the type of roofing or methods to
be used.
The process of choosing a contractor is called source
selection. Interested contractors would submit a plan of the work
and detail the methods they planned to use to satisfy the
government's requirements along with the estimated costs as their
bid. A board of government representatives would be established
to evaluate the contractors proposal. Factors for evaluating a
proposal would include items such as: price, technical excellence,
management capability, personnel qualifications, previous
experience, past performance and schedule compliance. The source
that offers the greatest value to the government in terms of
performance and the other factors stated in the government's
request for proposal will be chosen. There is no requirement to
choose the lowest bidder since advance cost estimates may not
indicate final actual costs. If the lowest bidder were chosen this
would encourage contractors to submit low initial cost estimates
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and present the likelihood for cost overruns. Each project should
have a specific set of criteria that is made known to the
contractor in the solicitation that will be used to evaluate the
bids.
This type of contract, while it reimburses a contractor for
his allowable costs, is not a "cost plus" contract. A cost plus
contract is a type of contract where the contractor is reimbursed
for his costs plus a certain percent is added to all costs as
profit. This type of contract provides an incentive for the
contractor to run up his costs since profits are tied to costs.
The cost plus award fee contract provides the contractor an
incentive to control costs since the award fee is tied to periodic
evaluations which include cost as a factor. Increasing costs above
the agreed upon estimate will actually lower the award fee unless
the original estimate is allowed to be adjusted upwards. The
greatest potential for fraud during this type of contract is the
fabrication of charges to increase the contract costs. This can
be greatly reduced by thoroughly evaluating the contractor's method
of accounting for and controlling costs and by periodic government
review.
Negotiation differs from sealed bidding in that discussions
may take place with offerors. The discussions are controlled by
the contracting officer and may be used to resolve uncertainties
concerning technical proposals. In the hurricane example, if one
contractor proposed using a rubber membrane roofing, and another







decide to ask all contractors to revise their initial estimates to
reflect the rubber roofing. During these discussions that the
contracting officer holds with each individual contractor, nothing
that any one contractor says is revealed to another contractor.
Auction techniques in which the government tells the contractor he
needs to reduce his price by a certain amount to be eligible are
not permitted. However, the contracting officer may tell the
contractor his estimate is too high for any further consideration.
After all discussions have been held, all contractors are given a
chance to revise their bids and submit a best and final offer.
2.5 Contractor Receiving of Subcontractor Bids
Prime contractors will solicit subcontractor bids to use as
a basis for forming their bids. Once a sub submits a bid to a
prime, the bid becomes a firm offer and binds the sub. This puts
a price ceiling on the work that the contractor will subcontract.
Some contractors engage in "bid shopping" after they receive the
contract. In bid shopping the prime contractor will try to
increase its profits by finding another subcontractor who will
perform the work cheaper than the sub that is committed. The prime
contractor is not obligated to use the subcontractor that is the
low bidder at the time the contractor submits his bid. Prime
contractors will often use confidential information from one
subcontractor's bid to try to lower another subcontractor's bid.
This practice hurts the subcontracting industry by shaving company
profits and may lead to poor workmanship or inflated bids by

17
subcontractors. Subcontractors will often try to make up profit
by looking for change orders.
2 . 6 Case Study
Public contract administrators have an enormous number of
rules and regulations to follow. It can be very tempting to bend
some of these rules for the benefit of the contracting agency. The
city of Atlanta awarded a $14 million airport parking garage to a
contractor that submitted its low bid three minutes late. The
Georgia court of appeals ruled that the city has to pay the next
low bidder more than $1 million in lost profits, legal fees and
interest. The late bid was only low by $10,500. The next low
bidder protested to the city the award of the contract. The letter
of protest was referred to the city's legal department and was
never answered. Local ordinances required that the protests be
answered within 10 days and inform the party of its right to an
administrative review. The mayor felt that being three minutes





CHAPTER 3; BID RIGGING
3. 1 Bid Rigging
The majority of construction contracts are awarded by sealed
bidding with the award going to the responsive responsible bidder
that submits the lowest price ( for more information about bidding
methodology see chapter 2 ) . This method of bidding provides for
competition among the contractors and ensures the lowest price for
the owner and is best suited for projects that have well defined
plans and specifications so that all bidders are bidding on the
same thing. Sealed competitive bidding provides the contractor
with a strong incentive to control his costs during the project.
The incentive to control costs can be so strong that the contractor
will often try to cut corners if he is losing money or behind
schedule (refer to chapter 5 for more information on cost cutting
and sloppy work)
.
Bid rigging is a practice in which some or all of the
contractors that are bidding on a project conspire to fix the
outcome of the bidding procedure. This illegal practice limits
competition. Schemes that allocate contracts and limit competition
can take many forms and are only limited by the imagination of the
involved parties. Common schemes include bid suppression or
limiting, complementary bidding, bid rotation and market division.
Bid rigging is a violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act (15
USC 1 ) . The Antitrust division of the Department of Justice has
primary prosecutive jurisdiction on all federal antitrust
violations. 20 The basis of the federal procurement system with few

19
exceptions (see chapters 2 and 10 ) , is that contracts are awarded
on the basis of free and open competition. This policy was first
set by statute in 1890. Title 10 U.S. Code section 2340(a) sets
forth a specific requirement that purchases and contracts for
property and services be made by formal advertising and shall be
awarded on a competitive basis to the lowest responsible bidder.
3 . 2 Bid Rigging Schemes 21
Bid suppression or limiting - In this type of scheme one or more
competitors agree with at least one other competitor to refrain
from bidding or agrees to withdraw a previously submitted bid so
that another competitor's bid will be accepted.
Complementary bidding - This scheme occurs when competitors submit
token bids that are too high to be accepted. Such bids are not
intended to secure the owner's acceptance but are merely designed
to give the appearance of genuine bidding.
Bid rotation - In bid rotation, all contractors participating in
the scheme submit bids, but by agreement take turns being the low
bidder.
Market division - Market division schemes are agreements to refrain
from competing in a designated portion of a market. A market may
be defined as a customer or geographic area. The results of such
a division is that competing firms will not bid or will submit only
complementary bids when a solicitation for bids is made by a
customer or in an area not assigned to them.
3.3 Indicators of Bid Rigging






schemes to reduce competition are
not readily visible,
following are some indicators of
possible anticompetitive
activities that were compiled by Department
of Defense's Inspector
General. 22 The following indicators by
themselves will not prove
that illegal anticompetitive activity
is occurring but are
sufficient to warrant further investigation
by the proper
authorities:
1, Bidders who are qualified and
capable of performing work do
not submit bids.
2) Certain contractors always bid
against each other or
conversely do not bid against one another.
3) The successful bidder repeatedly
subcontracts work to
companies that submitted higher bids or to
companies that picked
up bid packages and could have bid but
did not. (Government
contracts require that all bidders certify
that if they are not
the successful bidder they will not perform
work as
a subcontractor on the contract)
.
4) Different groups of contractors
appear to specialize in
federal, state, or local jobs exclusively.
5) There is an apparent pattern of
low bids regularly recurring.
A certain contractor may always be the low
bidder in a certain
geographic area or in a fixed rotation with other
bidders.
6) Failure of original bidders to rebid,
or an identical ranking
of the same bidders upon rebidding, when
original bids were
rejected as being too far over the owner's estimate.




on some bids than other bids of same type work with no logical
cost difference to account for the increase.
8) Joint venture bids where either contractor could have bid
individually as a prime.
9) Any incidents suggesting direct collusion among competitors,
such as the appearance of identical calculation or spelling
errors in two or more competitive bids, or the submission by one
firm of bids for other firms.
10) Competitors regularly socialize or appear to hold meetings,
or otherwise get together in the vicinity of procurement offices
shortly before bid filing deadlines.
11) Assertions by employees, former employees, or competitors
that an agreement to fix bids and prices or otherwise restrain
trade exists.
12) Bid prices appear to drop whenever a new or infrequent
bidder submits a bid.
Many of the above mentioned indicators are subtle and
verifying that one of the indicators exists could take a lot of
time and effort and involve the piecing together of bid results of
a large number of contracts for several geographic areas and time
periods.
3.4 Is Bid Rigging a Serious Problem ?
Several arguments have been given in defense of bid rigging.
One attorney argued that "it sets an upper limit on the price." 23
An industry spokesman claimed that bid rigging does not inflate






the state engineer's estimate.
These arguments do not make sense. A
higher owner's estimate
simply reflects the estimator's
unfamiliarity or uncertainty in
regard to the true market price. Free
and open competition will
set the true price in a market economy
provided no anticompetitive
behavior is taking place.
t.s penalties fnr Rid Rigging
Bid rigging is a violation of the Sherman
Antitrust Act.
Violation of the act exposes executives of the
violating companies
to imprisonment of up to three years and
their companies to fines
of up to one million dollars. Most jail sentences
handed out for
bid rigging are less than one year and
often amount only to
probation. 25 The corporations are subject to large civil
fines with
several judges handing out the one million dollar maximum
fines.
Sometimes the firms that are convicted of bid
rigging are
debarred' from bidding on any publicly funded
contracts. While at
first this might seem fair, it has tremendous
impact upon the
entire company and often the local market.
Debarring a contractor
whose primary source of business is publicly
funded contracts may
force the company to lay off a large portion of
its work force and
economically hurt many workers. Debarment may even
drive the price




A more appropriate penalty would be the
sentencing of key bid
rigging participants to jail terms of several years and
require




are not harsh enough to deter bid rigging activities. The fines
are absorbed by the company and are often not significant
deterrents, but no one wants to go to jail. There is a good deal
of plea bargaining in bid rigging trials. Often several
participants will be given immunity from prosecution to testify
against other participants.
3 . 6 Case Histories
Between 1979 and 1983 grand juries in 16 southern and
midwestern states brought charges against contractors for bid
rigging. As a result, fines of 44 million dollars and jail
sentences exceeding 4 4 years were handed out. 26 A GAO report
submitted to Congress in May of 1983 characterized bid rigging as
"a blatant corruption" of competitive bidding.
Four of the country's top five electrical contractor's were
being investigated by grand juries for bid rigging in 1983. 27
Fischbach and Moore, the nation's number one electrical contractor
at the time, was being investigated by fourteen grand juries. In
April of 1984, Fischbach and Moore was fined one million dollars.
Watson-Flagg a wholly owned Fischbach and Moore subsidiary received
a one half million dollar fine and its chairman was fined 35
thousand dollars and sentenced to one year probation for rigged
bids on a General Motors plant in Indianapolis.
On Long Island, five construction companies have dominated
major public works projects for more than a decade. In 1984
Newsday undertook a study of contracts awarded over the past 11





received 86 percent of all the money paid on all sewer and
highway
contracts of over one million dollars. Three of the firms
were
within 1.5 percentage points in their share of the
supposedly
competitive contracts. Over the 11 year period, $919.1 million of
more than $1 billion in state highway and county sewer contracts
28
were awarded to the five companies.
An industry source said that he had attended a series of
meetings among the five contracting firms at which they regularly
rigged their bids so that each firm would get a share of
the
available contracts. Labor unions were also involved in the bid
rigging scheme. Their role was to discourage outside bidders by
threatening them with labor trouble and to transmit bid figures
between various members of the contracting ring. The successful
contractor paid the labor leaders one percent of the bid price,
according to the source. The five firms are the largest heavy-
construction companies on Long Island and could be expected to win
a share of local contracts but it was the absence of outside
bidders on the contracts that triggered the suspicion of federal
and local law enforcement agencies.
3.7 Prevention
Highway construction lends itself to bid rigging has been
prevalent in many of these construction projects. Many of the job
locations are remote and only a few bidders are able to
economically mobilize for the projects. Highway construction
requires a large capital investment and many pieces of specialized






State departments of transportation are beginning to take
preventive actions against bid rigging. Highway officials in
Florida, Virginia, New York, and other states are taking proactive
steps by increasing their analysis of how busy contractors are in
various parts of the state and sizing contracts to maximize
competition. The departments of transportation are keeping better
abreast of market conditions and material prices. 29
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CHAPTER 4: INTEGRITY OF CONTRACTING PARTIES
4.1 Conflicts of Interest
In federal government contracting, the government employee has
a duty to perform his job in a way that best represents the
interest of the government. A conflict of interest occurs when the
employee bases his actions based upon the benefit he will receive
verses the government.
4.1a Officials Not to Benefit
The officials not to benefit clause is included in all federal
contracts, and prohibits any member of or delegate to Congress to
be a participating party to the contract or to receive any benefit
arising from the contract. 30 Contracting officers are forbidden
from awarding a contract to a government employee or to a business
concern or other organization owned or substantially owned or
controlled by one or more government employees. 31 This policy was
enacted to avoid conflicts between the employees interests and
their government duties. It also avoids the appearance of




Kickbacks, as defined in federal contracting, means "any
money, fee, commission, credit, gift, gratuity, thing of value, or
compensation of any kind which is provided directly or indirectly
to any prime contractor employee, subcontractor, or subcontractor
employee, for the purpose of improperly obtaining or rewarding
favorable treatment in connection with a prime contract or in





The Anti-Kickback Act of 1986 (41
USC 51-58) prohibits any
person from:
!, Providing, attempting to
provide, or offering to provide any
kickback.
a, soliciting, accepting, or
attempting to accept any kickbacks
.
3) including, directly or
indirectly, the amount of any kickback
in the contract price charged by
a subcontractor or in the
contract price charged by a prime
contractor to the United
This act also provides for criminal
penalties for any person
who knowingly and willfully
engages in kickbacks. Should the
contracting officer discover that
kickbacks have been made, the act
provides that the contracting officer
can offset the amount of the
Kickback with monies owed by the
United States to the prxme
contractor." This act also requires
a prime contractor or
subcontractor to report in writing to the
investigator general of
the contracting agency, the head
of the contracting agency or
Department of Justice if the agency does
not have an investigator
general any possible violation of the
act when the prime contractor
or subcontractor has reasonable
grounds to believe such violation
may have occurred.
The General Accounting Office and the
investigator general of
the contracting agency can review
the contractor's books and
records to ascertain whether there has
been a violation of the act.
one such example of a kickback scheme
is a contractor paying a
subcontractor to submit a high guote that
will be used as the basis
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of negotiations for a change order.
Participation in kickbacks in
federal contracting is a criminal offense.
It can be seen from the
above example that kickbacks increase the
cost of a contract.
a . t. Bribery
A bribe is the giving of money or a favor
or promise of money
or a favor to a person in a position
of trust to influence his
judgement or conduct. 35 Kickbacks are usually associated
with a
contractor paying a subcontractor to do something
illegal or visa
versa. A bribe is usually associated with
the prime contractor or
subcontractor giving something of value
to the contract
administrator in return for favorable treatment
from the contract
administrator. An example would be the payment
of money from a
prime contractor to an inspector in return
for the inspector




Gratuities' are different from bribery in that
there is
usually no request for a specific action in
exchange for what is
being given. Gratuities are given to enhance
a more favorable
relationship between the contractor and owner."
Under federal
contracts, a contractor may be terminated if it
is determined that
the contractor offered or gave a gratuity to an
officer, official,
or employee of the government and intended,
by the gratuity to
obtain a contract or favorable treatment under
a contract.
37 The
offer or acceptance of a gratuity is a felony.
The contracting
official should report any attempts by the
contractor to offer a
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bribe or gratuity. Failure to report an attempted bribe or
gratuity could latter turn the tables on the contracting official
by the contractor reporting that the contracting official was




Executive order 11222 of may 8, 1965 and 5 CFR 735 required
that contracting agencies prescribe standards of conduct. The
standards of conduct contain:
1) Disciplinary measures for persons violating the standards of
conduct, and,
2) requirements for employee financial disclosure and
restrictions on private employment after leaving government
service.
The standards of conduct governing defense department personnel are
presented in appendix B.
4.6 National Scandal 39
In 1973 Spiro Agnew resigned his office as Vice President of
the United States while under investigation for accepting bribes.
The story begins in the early 1960 's when Spiro Agnew was the
Baltimore county executive. The county executive is in charge of
the various county government departments including public works.
While Spiro Agnew was the county executive he accepted bribes from
several architect/engineering (A/E) firms in exchange for
selecting the firms for certain design projects. Selection of A/E
firms was done on a noncompetitive basis. The firm that was best





experience conveyed to the A/E selection committee in the form of
resumes and interviews was selected as the A/E firm to perform
design work for the county. The selection committee was composed
of engineers in the public works committee who worked under the
county executive. The selection committees decision could be
overridden at the county executive level
.
One A/E firm paid bribes to Agnew through an intermediary.
The firm would inform the intermediary which design jobs they
wanted and the intermediary would carry the message back to Agnew.
Agnew would see to it that the firm was selected for the design
contract. A certain percentage ranging from two to five percent
of the value of the design contract was kicked back to Agnew when
payments from the county were received. The intermediary accepted
the payments from the design firm and carried them to Agnew.
In 1966 Spiro Agnew became the governor of the state of
Maryland. He appointed Jerome Wolfe as the state secretary of
highways. Under Wolfe bribes continued to flow to Agnew for design
firms seeking state design contracts.
While governor Agnew approved the construction of a second Bay
Bridge parallel to the first bridge starting at the eastern shore
of Anne Arundel County and spanning the Chesapeake Bay. It just
so happened that Agnew was part owner of a 107 acre tract of land
that was needed to build the bridge.
In 1968 Spiro Agnew was chosen to be Richard Nixon's Vice
Presidential running mate. One A/E contractor even traveled to the
white house offices to finish making a payment owed to Agnew for
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work received while Agnew was governor of Maryland.
4 . 7 Closing Thoughts
There are many rules, regulations, and laws which govern
federal construction contracting. It is important that these rules
and the standards of conduct be followed. If continued violations
of the contracting rules occur, the public will begin to loose
confidence in the contracting system. Members of the contracting
community that know of illegal activities and remain silent are
further contributing to the problem. In these types of situations
the public usually becomes outraged and demands more regulation and
a better accounting for public money. Increased regulation leads
to more rules and further contributes to making federal
construction contracting a bureaucratic pursuit and increases
costs. The bottom line is that officials that abuse their
authority lead to a weakening of the federal contracting system and
increase costs for the construction that will be built.
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,~HaPTKR 5: MORTAL WQ ""RKMANSHIP
b
1 San£E3S3aClB Risk to
Perform
On a fixed price contract, the
contractor is responsible for
performing all work that is specified in
the contract drawings and
written contract documents for a
fixed sum of money that is
represented by his bid. This type of
contract places the maximum
amount of risk on the contractor.
If a contractor underestimates
the amount of time and
materials necessary to perform the
work, he will lose money unless
he can reduce his costs. The cost
to perform the work can only be
decreased through an increase in the
contractor's efficiency or by
. ,„h Hnina less work or lower quality work than is
cutting corners and do g uljv
specified in the contract.
A knowledgeable inspector representing
the owner will be able
to detect inferior materials or non-conforming
work and report them
to the project manager or contract administrator.
The key to
eliminating inferior materials and poor
workmanship lies in the
contract documents, the inspector's and
contractor's familiarity
with the required quality of materials
and workmanship, and the
inspector's and contract administrator's
ability to ensure the
contractor performs according to the contract.
k.2 Me?*"ring and Enforcing Performance
in federal contracts, there are several
key contract clauses*
in addition to the written technical
specifications that allow the





5.2a Material and Workmanship Clause A0
The material and workmanship clause requires that all material
that is to be incorporated into the work be new and submitted to
the contracting officer for approval. The clause also states that
if any material in the contract is referred to by trade name, make
or catalogue number, it is for the purpose of establishing a
standard of quality and not meant to limit competition. The
contractor has the option to use any material that in the judgement
of the contracting officer is equal to that named in the
specifications. Right away this presents a potential problem. For
example, if a contract specification mentions a toilet manufactured
by company A, and the contractor submits for approval a toilet
manufactured by company B, the contracting officer will have to
make a judgement as to whether toilet B is equal to toilet A. This
judgement is likely to be subjective as both toilets will probably
serve the design function. The contractor operating under the
philosophy of minimizing his costs to maximize his profits has
probably submitted the least expensive toilet he could find that
would do what a toilet is supposed to do. The contracting officer
may select toilet A. If this happens, there is likely to be a
disagreement from the contractor. The contractor's remedy is to
ask for a contracting officer's decision in regards to the toilet
meeting the specification. If the contractor still does not like
the answer of the contracting officer he will have to file a claim
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(see chapter 12 for discussion of
claims)
.
Brand names do not necessarily represent
a level of quality.
The function of the product should
be specified. In the toilet
example, it may be appropriate to
specify dimensions, flush
capacity or that the toilet conform
to nationally recognized
testing standards such as ANSI* or ASTM*.
Thus, if the contracting officer can
make an objective
decision Is to whether toilet B is egual
to toilet A, there never
should have been a brand name mentioned
in the specification.
Performance or design requirements should
be used to specify a
material. Most times the inclusion of
brand names in federal
contracts is a carry over of design firms
that are used to
designing private sector jobs or just plain laziness
on the part
of the designer, but this is not always
the case.
A recent contract at the Naval
Academy involved the
replacement of numerous hot water heat exchangers
and piping. The
contract specifications required a heat
exchanger with coils
configured in the vertical position. A
brand name was not
mentioned in the specifications but it was
pretty clear by the
features that the designer chose to specify
for the heat exchanger
that only one type of product would meet
the contract requirement.
After bids were opened, the contractors-
bids were compiled and
compared to the government estimate. All
of the bids were well
above the government estimate. Several of
the bidders commented
that there were other products on the market
that would perform the
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function but that they had bid on the specified product and that
was the reason for such high bids. All of the bids were rejected
as being excessive and the project specifications were modified to
permit a wider variety of heat exchangers. The project was
readvertised and bid. The new bids reflected a significant amount
of savings over the previously bid project. Upon further
investigation, it was found that the designer had originally
received help from a supplier in formulating the specification for
the heat exchangers. This particular supplier was the only local
source for the vertical heat exchanger. It appears that the
supplier knew that he was the only source and expected all of the
contractors to get guotes from him for the heat exchangers. Since
there was no direct competition it appears that he was prepared to
charge as high of a price as he thought he could get away with and
still receive the orders. This last example serves to point out
that it is not always the contractor that will try to cut corners
by using inferior materials, but the opposite may happen before the
contractor bids the job. If the specification would not have been
revised, the government would have in all likelihood received the
vertical coil heat exchangers at an inflated price that is simply
passed on to the tax payers in the form of higher taxes or fewer
construction projects being built for the benefit of the federal
government
.
The material and workmanship clause also states that all work
shall be performed in a skillful and workmanlike manner but does
not define skillful and workmanlike. The technical specifications
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should describe the procedures for installing
the material or
performing the work. In the absence of well
defined specifications
for the execution of the work, industry
standards are expected to
be followed. This may sound rather
vague but many trade




5.2b Inspection of Construction
This clause reguires that the contractor set
up and maintain
an adequate inspection system to perform
inspections that will
ensure that the work performed conforms to
contract requirements.
The contractor is required to maintain
written records of
inspections performed and turn them over to the
government. This
clause does not define an adequate inspection
system. Section 1400
of Navy construction contract specification
describes the
organization and testing requirements that a contractor
is required
to maintain. On large federal contracts,
typically over two
million dollars, the contractor will employ a person
who is solely
dedicated to quality control. This quality control
person is on
the job site at all times and reports to an officer
of the
construction company not to the job site superintendent.
This
arrangement eliminates any possible conflicts of
interest between
the job site superintendent who is more likely to be concerned
with




in addition to the tests that the technical
specifications




right to perform further inspections and tests as the contracting
officer deems necessary. The contractor is obligated to remove and
replace any work or materials that are found not to conform to the
contract requirements. This clause gives the government the right
to require the contractor to remove existing work for inspection.
If the existing work is found to meet contract requirements, the
government will pay to have the contractor repair any damage,
otherwise the contractor is responsible for the cost to repair the
work.
Since the contractor is responsible for performing all of the
tests and inspections, it is important that the government contract
administrator has confidence in the contractor's quality control
organization and procedures. A situation of the fox guarding the
henhouse has a potential to exist. Put another way, it is very
easy for a contractor to falsify test and inspection results.
Technical specification sections contain details of the required
tests and inspections. The contract administrator should assure
himself that the contractor is aware of the requirements and has
an organized plan or approach for performing and recording tests
and inspections.
5.2c Buy American Act - Construction Materials42
The Buy American Act (41 U.S. C. 10) directs the government to
give preference to domestic construction materials. The clause is
rather short except for several definitions and is reproduced
below:
"The contractor agrees that only domestic construction material

38
L he used by the contractor, subcontractors, materialmen, and
suppliers in the performance
of the contract, except for
foreign
<<= ,nv listed in this contract."
construction materials, if a y,
c a
onf„i na the industrial stage, it is
With more and more countries
e teri g
becoming guite commonplace
that construction materials are
made
outside of this country. Most
technical sections of specifications
in federal contracts instruct
the contractor that construction
materials are to be brought to the
site in the original containers.
Although this wording was probably
intended more for the protection
of materials at the 30b site,
it can help the inspector
in
cognizing foreign construction materials,
as most boxes and
cartons contain information about
the manufacturing company and
country of origin. Most large
pieces of machinery or eguipment
will have identification or
nameplates that will show the country
of origin.
^.?.d cc 1 ir+ e>T' f '3i t Bolts
The most important property of
bolts used in construction is
strength. Bolts of different strengths
contain different markings
on their heads. A counterfeit
bolt is a bolt that looks like
a
legitimate bolt and contains all
of the markings that would
indicate it is of a certain strength
but when subjected to a load
test will fail before it reaches
the strength indicated by the
markings on the bolt head.
Counterfeit bolts are dangerous and
potentially could cause catastrophic
damages if they are relied
upon in structural members.
A judge recently sentenced a defense
contractor to three years
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in prison and fined him $750,000 for faking
quality tests on engine
bolts used in military and commercial aircraft.
Prosecutors of the
case contend that the contractor saved
more than $ 1.5 million by
failing to properly test some 9 million
bolts between 1979 and
1989. '3
S
>» owner's °^hts in E^rH to Subrti tut ion of Materials
in federal contracts, the government has
the right to expect
that the contractor furnish the materials that
are specified in the
contract. If the contractor furnishes materials
that do not meet
the specification, the contracting officer
may require that the
contractor remove the materials and replace them
with materials
that conform to the contract requirements."
In many instances,
such as with bolts, the contract requires
that the contractor
provide a certificate from the manufacturer
stating that the
material meets the requirements mentioned in the
specifications.
If it is found that the material in fact
does not meet the
requirements of the specification, the manufacturer
may be liable




in other instances, where it is found
that materials are
installed that do not meet the contract
specifications, the
contracting officer may not require the contractor
to remove the
materials but may require the contractor provide a
price credit in




installed and those specified. This assumes that the contractor
has installed material that is cheaper than that specified in the
contract. This is usually the case, as it was previously stated
that contractors under a fixed price contract operate to minimize
costs.
5.3 Conditions Conducive to Material and Workmanship Problems
In August 1986 , the defense department's Office of the
Inspector General issued a research report on unauthorized quality
assurance practices by contractors. The report concluded that in
22 of 24 DOD investigation cases studied, the contractors
intentionally and knowingly delivered or planned to deliver
products that were not in conformance with contract requirements.
Some other indicators and conditions conducive to unauthorized
quality assurance practices include: 45
1) A history of poor performance by the contractor (remember
that a contractor is driven by the profit motive and that a poor
performer is probably losing money and will be looking for areas
to cut costs)
.
2) Negative pre-award survey (if other customers have had
problems with this contractor, there is a chance that problems
will continue in the future)
.
3) Awards to unusually low bidders (extremely low bid does not




4) Government quality assurance
representatives (inspectors)
reliance on contractor falsified documentation.
5) insufficient government
quality assurance practices, (often
the government will not perform any
inspections but will rely on
the contractor certification and
documentation)
.
The DOD Office of the Inspector
General's report was not
specific for construction (report was for
all purchases made by
DOD) but contained many findings that
are directly applicable to
construction.
5.4 Clogir'q Thoughts
Product substitution cases sometimes
involve government
employees. For example, gratuities and
bribes have been paid to
government inspection personnel to accept
items which do not








Sometimes it is necessary during the construction project to
make changes to the design that cause the contractor to perform
additional work. An owners actions or lack of certain actions may
also cause the contractor to perform extra work or incur additional
costs. When all aspects of this additional work are agreed upon
by both parties it is put in writing and becomes a modification to
the contract. The contract clauses and general conditions will
govern the circumstances in which the contractor is entitled to
additional compensation.
6.2 Changes Clause46
This clause gives the government the right to make changes
within the general scope of the contract including changes:
1) In the specifications (including drawings and designs).
2) In the method or manner of performance of the work.
3) In the government-furnished facilities, equipment, materials,
services or site.
4) Directing acceleration in the performance of the work.
If any of the above changes causes an increase or decrease in
the contractor's cost of the performance of any part of the work
under the contract, the contractor is entitled to an equitable
adjustment , and the contract will be modified in writing.
The contracting officer may make an interpretation or
determination that causes the contractor to incur additional costs.
The contracting officer's interpretation may be that the contractor
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is al ready rehire, hy the
contact to perform the worK,
in which
case the contrector will
not he entitle, to an eguita
hle adjustment
-^ .nneals the contractingTf the contractor app unc
under this clause. I
^n
o£ficer . s decision an, wins.
he will he compensate*
for hr
additional wor*. -
contrector is not oniy entitle,
to a^t.ona
compensation for the extra wor*
hut also for actional costs
owner, retirement for
.dditional site worK that
pushes th
oontraotor.s roofing into the
winter season. Perforin, roof
under these distances is lively
to he more expensive and
^the
oontraotor will he entitle,
to his addition.! allowahle
costs.
Any written or or.l order
which also includes direction,
instruction, interpret.tion, or
determination that causes a change
shall he treated as a chang
e order provided that the
contractor
*. Hn, officer written notice stating
the date,
aives the contracting
^r,^i that the contractor
*„* source of the order and
me
circumstances, and
w.~>- The contractor is only
regards the order as a change
order.
*-«
-Fo-r a oeriod of twenty days before
eligible to recover his costs
f r p
,.,-• r-acoc in which there
he gives notice to the
contracting officer. Cases
4 4- ie a change or not will be
is disagreement over whether
it is
w 4. r. 19 It will be assumed for the
moment that
discussed in chapter 2.
n
the owner has either caused
or requested a change.
6 ? Typpg of changes
Below is a list of some of
the types of ch.nges that
can he
expected in construction:
a) addiiiSB^S - The owner has
reguested that the contractor
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perform additional work on the job. The work must be within the
general scope of the project. Adding additional electric outlets
is considered within the general scope, building another identical
building next door under the same contract is not. The
interpretation of the general scope is fairly broad but the above
examples serve as the two extremes.
b) Ripple effect - A change to one type of work effects the
performance of another type of work. For example, additional site
work pushes the roofing work into winter.
c) Delay - The job or some portion of the work has come to a
halt or will take longer because of the owner's action or lack of
action. For example, the owner may not review and return the
contractors material submittals in a timely manner causing the
contractor to fall behind schedule and incur additional overhead
costs for being on the job a longer period of time than expected.
d) Change in methods - Typically there are no limitations placed
on the contractor as to how he may perform the work. It is assumed
that he will be motivated by profit and choose the most efficient
method and pass on the lower cost to the owner in the form of a
lower bid. Restrictions on a contractor's performance methods
should be mentioned in the specifications. Typical restrictions
may include certain work hours or that the contractor must only
work on one phase at a time.
e) Differing site conditions - There are two types of differing
site conditions that a contractor may encounter: 47
I) Subsurface or latent physical conditions at the site which
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differ materially from those indicated in
the contract
II) Unknown physical conditions at
the site, of an unusual
nature, which differ materially from those
ordinarily encountered
and generally recognized as inhering
in work of the character
provided for in the contract.
f) K~1eration - The owner may want the contractor to
speed up




- A defective specification is one
in which the performance is impossible
or so economically
unfeasible as to render its performance
impossible. Technical
incompetence of a contractor does not make
a specification
defective.
6.4 Pricing of Change Orders
The government will send out a written
request for the
contractor to provide a cost proposal for the
types of changes
mentioned under paragraphs a, d, and f above.
The contractor is
responsible for notifying the contracting officer
that he has
encountered a change of the type in paragraphs b,
c, e, and g in
order to be eligible for compensation. No
changes to the contract
will be made after the contractor has received
his final payment.
g , mnj-r-ctor-* Proposal: Modification of Proposals-
Price
Breakdown48
This contract clause requires that the contractor
provide a
price breakdown for additional work. The exact
format of the price




that the proposal shall be in sufficient detail to permit an
analysis of all material, labor, equipment, subcontract, and
overhead costs, as well as profits and shall cover all work
involved in the modification. Appendix A is a sample form for cost
proposals used for Navy construction contracts. It is typical that
contractors will break the work down into unit quantities (square
feet of floor tile, linear feet of pipe, etc.) and will furnish
unit prices for labor, materials and equipment and price overhead
and profit as a percentage of their labor, material, and equipment
costs. This type of breakdown has a distinct advantage over lump
sum pricing of changes. Materials are sold through suppliers on
a unit basis (square foot, linear foot, etc.) and most estimating
manuals report labor productivity in terms of units of output per
hour or hours per unit of output.
This unit pricing allows direct comparison between the
contractor's estimate and the government engineer's estimate
prepared using published unit prices in various estimating manuals.
When costs are a factor in any determination of a contract price
adjustment, such costs shall be in accordance with part 31 of the
FAR and the DOD FAR Supplement. 49 Part 31 of the FAR contains costs
that are allowable as part of a contract change. Typical allowable
costs include:
1) Materials (less any discount or rebate) including delivery
and sales tax.














9) Maintenance and repair
of property.
10) Bonding.







5) interest on borrowings.
6) Legislative lobbying.
7) Loss on other contracts.
8) Income taxes.
.,,, ro i af ed to the contract, i.e.




„. 1. 2, 3, and 10 of the
allowable costs are considered
direct costs and can he traced
directly to the J*. The regaining
items are considered overhead
iteras. A contractor may lump
all of
these costs together with the
unallowable costs in figuring his
home office overhead costs but
should still have records that
show




L Hsgafejafcipg £bs Sana* <-"-< -"* Pri " inC| Data
Changes or edifications to the contract
are negotiated with
the contractor. The contractor
is in the best position to estimate
Lhat his actual costs are expected
to be for the changed work.
Many contractors maintain
historical records on past work
performance and should be able to
estimate within a narrow range
-*« wn-rk Since the contractor has more
the cost of performing the ork.
b
knowledge than an owner in the
area of estimating his costs, a
potential situation exists for the
contractor to deliberately
overestimate the costs for the work and
overcharge the owner.
in 1962, congress passed the Truth
in Negotiations Act. The
act required the submission of
current and complete cost and
pricing data to the government prior
to the pricing of a change or
Edification of any contract if the price
adjustment is expected
to exceed $100,000, or any lesser amount
if so prescribed by the
*
agency head .
Cost and pricing data means all facts
as of the date of price
agreement that prudent buyers and
sellers would reasonably expect
to affect price negotiations
significantly. Cost and pricing data
• j ..-i anri are therefore verifiable and
are factual, not judgmental, and
include items such as: a) vendor
quotations b) nonrecurring
costs c) unit cost trends such as
those associated with labor
efficiency. Under the Truth in
Negotiation Act, the contractor is
required to certify that, to the best
of his knowledge and belief,
the data submitted is accurate,
complete, and current. The act
allows a price reduction based on the
amount of overpricing due to
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defective data submissions. If the submission of data was intended
to mislead the government, the government may reduce the contract
price by double the amount of the price increase which resulted
from the contractor's submission of defective data. The contractor
may also be prosecuted for knowingly submitting defective data
under other federal statutes that are discussed in chapter 12
.
Some of the ways in which inaccurate higher price data have been
submitted to the government include: °
1) Using blank quotation forms obtained from material vendors.
2) Obtaining quotations at book or catalogue prices which were
higher than the costs known to the contractor.
3) Not disclosing rebates received from vendors on purchases.
It is important that the contract administrator review in detail
the contractor's proposal for a change. The proposal should be
reviewed to determine if any of the above mentioned conditions of
inaccurate pricing exist. Also the proposal should be reviewed to
determine if there are work items that the contractor is charging
as additional work that should be included in the base contract*
and the contractor is already required to perform. The costs being
submitted should be verified to ensure that they are allowable.
This may require that the contractor submit an annual report or
statement that breaks down his overhead costs into categories as
overhead usually appears on an estimate as a percentage of direct
costs.
It is much easier to verify the correct price for materials
than labor by calling several suppliers or looking in published
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price catalogues for similar types of materials. Just because a
contractor has submitted a proposal with what appears to be a high
labor cost does not mean that the contractor has submitted
inaccurate pricing data or is trying to mislead the owner. The
contractor may be unfamiliar with the type of work being reguested
in the change and the high price represents his lack of skill in
performing that type of work and hence his element of risk. Labor
prices can be verified if it is known that the contractor has
historical labor records or if the changed work is similar to that
being performed on the base contract. The contracting officer can
examine any of the contractor's records that he deems necessary to
determine if the cost and pricing data submitted is accurate . 51
For DOD contracts, the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) can be
called to assist the contracting officer in reviewing the
contractor's records. A typical reguest of the DCAA is the
verification of home office overhead for a contractor.

51
CHAPTER 7: PAYMENT PRACTICES
7.1 Failure of Owner to Pay Contractor
The failure of an owner to pay a contractor is one of the most
significant ways in which an owner can breach a contract. To
determine if a breach in the contract has occurred, information
surrounding the owner's decision to not make payment must be known.
There are several justifiable reasons why an owner might refuse to
make payment or withhold a portion of the payment:
1) The contractor is behind schedule.
2) Contractor has billed for more work than is actually
installed.
3) Contractor work or material is of questionable quality.
4) Contractor is billing for work that was never performed.
5) Administrative error.
6) Labor violations on job.
7) To protect the interests of the owner.
There are also several other not so justifiable reasons why
an owner may not pay a contractor:
1) Owner is having financial or cash flow problems.
2) Owner is using superior financial position as a bargaining
tool to negotiate with contractor or persuade contractor
to do something as a further condition of payment.
The legitimate reasons cited above should be relatively easy to
verify.
7.1a The contractor is Behind Schedule
The contractor submitted schedule can be checked to determine
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if the project is on schedule or behind.
In federal contracts it
is the contractor's responsibility
to submit a schedule for the
government's approval and to maintain
an updated copy." If the
contractor does not submit a schedule,
the contracting officer can
withhold approval of progress payments
until the required schedule
is submitted. It is also the
contractor's responsibility to break
down the project into work packages and
indicate units, quantity,
and price for each unit of the work
package." This is commonly
referred to as the schedule of
prices. The owner can use the
schedule of prices to compare the amount
that the contractor is
requesting for payment with the amount
that should be paid
according to the actual quantity and
type of work that is
completed. The actual quantity that is
complete can be compared
with the total quantity listed on
the schedule of prices to
determine a percentage of completion
for that work item. This
percentage of completion can be compared
to the contractor's
schedule to determine if the project is behind
schedule for that
item.
2 tt r^^ctc- has BU1H fnr More
Work Than Ts Actua lly
installed
A field survey of actual units
completed compared with the
amount of units the contractor claims
are complete will determine
if the contractor has billed for
more work than is actually
completed. This is not necessiarily
a sign of fraud,
contractor may have been a little over
anxious about billi
order to improve his cash flow or may





submitting the bill for payment. Most contractors bill on a
monthly basis on government contracts. These billings are
sometimes prepared up to a week in advance based upon a quantity
that the superintendent projects will be installed.
7.1c Contractor Work or Material Is of Questionable Quality
The quality of the materials is a possible gray area requiring
interpretation of the contract specifications. The actual decision
of whether the material meets the specifications should have been
made well in advance to the material being installed. Government
contracts require the submission of all materials to be
incorporated in the contract for the approval of the contracting
officer. 4 To determine if the installed material is of acceptable
quality should only entail comparing the installed material with
the approved submittal .
The determination of whether the workmanship is acceptable
requires an interpretation of the contract specification. The
contractor is only required to meet the minimum specified criteria.
In the absence of a well defined specification for workmanship, a
contractor can be expected to comply with workmanship that is
standard for the industry. The industry standards are often
published by a trade association or may be techniques that have
evolved over time as acceptable practices. For example, it is
perfectly acceptable for paint on a wall to have a non-uniform
appearance up close. The acceptable industry standard is to stand
back five feet and look at the wall, any defects observed from this
distance require correction. The five feet inspection rule is not
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referred to in the paint specification. A typical paint
specification will state that the paint is to have a uniform
appearance but will not define uniform.
7 . Id Billing for Work That Was Never Performed
Billing for work that was not performed differs from billing
for more work than is actually installed. In the latter case the
contractor has the intent to perform the work. The first case is
fraud. A typical case is when a contractor submits a bill to the
owner for additional compensation (change order or extra) for work
he claims to have performed that was not part of his contract.
The government is protected from this practice by the differing
sites condition contract clause. This clause states that the
contractor shall, upon encountering a condition that differs
materially from that described in the contract or from that which
is typically to be encountered, immediately notify the contracting
officer in writing. 55 This notification allows the contracting
officer to observe the differing condition and make the decision
that would minimize cost and best solve the problem. Without this
notification by the contractor the government is not responsible
for compensating the contractor. Although the contract clause
states that written notification must be made by the contractor
before he proceeds, if it can be shown that the contracting officer
had knowledge of the differing condition and remained silent while
the contractor proceeded, then the contractor will probably be able
to receive payment for the extra work. The penalities for this




An administrative error may be the reason why a contractor
does not receive payment. While this may be an honest mistake with
no ill will intended, it is still likely to disrupt the
contractor's cash flow and the contractor may be entitled to extra
compensation in the form of interest because of the delay in
receiving payment. The government prompt payment contract clause
requires the government to make payment to a contractor fourteen
days after receiving a correct and complete invoice for payment.
If payment is received late by the contractor, the contractor will
receive interest on the payment. The interest rate is set every
six months by the Treasury Department of the United States.
7. If Labor Violations
Under federal construction contracts, payment may be withheld
from the contractor in such an amount that is necessary to pay
laborers and mechanics employed by the contractor or any
subcontractor the full amount of wages required by the contract. 57
This type of withholding occurs when contractors are not paying
their employees in accordance with wages established by the Davis
Bacon Act.
7.1q Withholding to Protect Owners Interest
This is a broad category and encompasses such areas as
withholding payment because a contractor has caused damage to the
facility and has yet to make the necessary repairs. Another
example would be the installation of a mechanical system. The
mechanical system may be 100 percent installed but it has not yet
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been tested. The owner does not want to pay the entire 100 percent
until he has an assurance that the system is operating as designed.
The payments under fixed-price construction contracts clause gives
the contract administrator the authority to withhold up to 15
percent of a payment until the contract administrator is convinced
that satisfactory performance has been achieved.
7.2 Obligation of Payment
The duty to pay a contractor is a serious obligation. A small
contractor will not be able to finance large amounts of money for
long periods of time and may go out of business if payments are not
received shortly after an invoice for payment is submitted. Some
owners take advantage of this situation by using their superior
financial position (owner has money and is the one making payments)
to get the contractor to perform extra work without compensation
with the promise to expedite a payment or ensure that the payment
makes it through the owner's bureaucratic payment system on time.
The owner should have all the financing arranged before the
start of the project and should obtain additional financing if
necessary to ensure that the contractor is paid on time.
A contractor working with the federal government will not have
a problem concerning the owner's finances. Negotiating with a
contractor based on any promises that his payment request will
receive any special treatment is clearly a violation of the





CHAPTER 8: ORGANIZED CRIME
8.1 The Criminal Organization
When one hears the words organized crime, immediate thoughts
of gangsters, the mob or the mafia along with gambling, drugs, and
other highly profitable crimes come to mind. Organized crime
simply means that there is a formal structured organization that
coordinates and carries out criminal activities. The mafia is just
one such organization.
8.2 Organized Crime's Involvement in Construction
Organized crime is also involved in construction. The extent
of organized crime's involvement and influence in New York city is
almost legendary. Organized crime is involved on many illegal
activities that were previously discussed such as bid rigging and
labor violations. It is well known that concrete in New York city
is controlled by the mafia. A Connecticut contractor spent nearly
three months preparing a bid for the concrete portion of
Manhattan's new $486 million Jacob K. Javits Convention Center.
The Connecticut contractors bid would have been under the $31
million bid submitted by S & A Concrete Company if he would have
bid on the job. He dropped out of the bidding at the last minute
after a visit and a couple of phone calls from several associates
of convicted crime boss Anthony Salerno (part owner of S & A
Concrete) . 59
The construction industry in New York city is so plagued by
crime and corruption that New York governor Mario Cumo formed a
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special construction industry strike force consisting of about 100
prosecutors, investigators, accountants, and analysts.
Labor officials are often involved in organized crime.
Corrupt labor unions are often the enforcement arm of organized
crime. Teamsters in New York have often slowed or blocked delivery
of building materials to builders who do not pay extortion fees.
There have also been labor disruptions at jobs not paying kickbacks
to organized crime. The costs that the labor unions extract from
the contractors and subcontractors are passed on to the developers
and owners resulting in higher construction costs. Money that is
paid towards union benefits such as pension and insurance if often
diverted to the pockets of corrupt union officials. Companies run
by organized crime have been able to cut costs by not paying
benefits and thus are able to under bid competition. The victims
of organized crime include: union members, owners, and builders.
New York city's numerous statutes and building codes have
contributed to corrupt practices in the building industry. An
organization with control over suppliers, union officials and city
inspectors can improve the speed and efficiency of the construction
process. Thus it can be said that organized crime does deliver a
product, a guarantee against delays, and labor unrest. For a
price, contractors are even allowed to use non-union labor.
Contractors performing work without organized crime's approval (not
paying extortion fees) would often find portions of their work
ripped out. The influence of organized crime is almost like a tax.
Contractors often find it easier to roll over and pay the extortion
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fees and pass the cost on to the customer than to fight through the
legal system. If all contractors are paying extortion fees, the
fees work just like a tax. All contractors would have a mandatory
fixed cost to add to their bid. The real losers become the owners
who are paying the higher construction costs and the workers who
are not receiving union benefits.
8.3 Fighting Organized Crime
Eliminating the influence of organized crime is difficult, few
victims are willing to cooperate for fear of physical harm. The
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) passed in
1970 was designed to seek the eradication of organized crime by
providing new remedies to deal with its unlawful activities. The
act makes it illegal for any persons who have received any income
derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering
activity or through collection of unlawful debt to use or invest,
directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds
of such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the
establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in,
or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
In other words, it is illegal for the criminal organization to
operate a legitimate business that is established from the money
generated from the illegal activities of the criminal organization.
Racketeering is defined in the act as: any act or threat
involving murder, kidnaping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery,
extortion, or dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, which
is chargeable under state law and punishable by imprisonment for
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more than one year. Racketeering in construction consists mainly
of bribery and extortion. Freelance racketeering is almost as
common as that related to mafia families. Under RICO assets can
be seized from racketeers.
Some companies have become fed up with racketeering and will
not undertake any new building projects in an area known to be
riddled with corruption. In one case, a large New Jersey
corporation was planning to expand but did not want to build in New
Jersey. Company executives cited the reasons as not wanting to
go through the same ordeal as the last time they built: job site
prostitution, loan shark rings, kickbacks, and sweetheart contracts
for favored suppliers.
The governor of New Jersey received word of the corporation's
plan to build out of state and called in the newly formed division
of criminal justice. The Criminal Justice Division set up a
meeting with company executives. The company executives agreed
that if anyone approached them with a corrupt offer they would
cooperate fully with law enforcement officials. Rather that stake
out the construction site looking for corruption, a different
approach was tried. The Criminal Justice Division worked with the
company to set up procedures that would preclude corruption.
Some of the recommendations of the Criminal Justice Division
included:
1) Use buddy system for meetings with worrisome outsiders who
might be reluctant to make a corrupt offer or threat with more than
one company witness present.
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2) Set up formal procedures for awarding construction contracts
in which the decisions seem to be made at a much higher level than
the front line. This gives the front line employees an out if he
is pressured to come through with a contract for a certain supplier
or subcontractor.
3) Keep checks and balances separate (i.e. audit staff separate
from contract award staff) , labor negotiator who only has authority
to deal with unions and no other phases. This will deter a corrupt
union from demanding contracts for friendly suppliers as the price
of labor peace.
When a potential criminal sees that the system is tight, it
tends to discourage an approach. Tight procedures enforced from
the top to the bottom of a corporation send out the message that
such an approach will not be tolerated.
An owner or contract administrator who believes that organized
crime's influence is present at their project should not take
matters into their own hands. The owner or contract administrator
should notify the proper authorities as to the criminal activity.
As mentioned previously, many people are reluctant to be witnesses
because of the threat of physical violence. The other chapters in
this paper have presented unethical and fraudulent acts that were
for the most part committed by a single contractor acting alone
(exception would include bid rigging) and did not involve the




CHAPTER 9: LABOR CONCERNS
9.1 Introduction
There are numerous labor laws and regulations that are
specific to federal government contracts. The consistent
enforcement of these labor laws is important to maintain the
integrity of the federal contracting system. A contractor that
does not abide by the reguired labor laws and regulations has an
unfair cost advantage over competitors that abide by the rules.
9.2 Contract Work Hours and Safety Standards Act (40 USC 3 27-
333) 61
This act reguires that contractors on all government contracts
over $ 2,000 pay laborers and mechanics at a rate of a least one
and one half times the basic rate of pay for any work over 4 hours
per week.
9.3 Davis Bacon Act (40 USC 2769-2769-71 62
This act reguires that no laborer or mechanic employed upon
the site of work shall receive less than the prevailing wage rates
as determined by the Secretary of Labor. Prevailing wage rates for
a specific geographic area are calculated by Department of Labor
surveys and are incorporated as part of the contract documents.
This act is applicable to all federal government and District of
Columbia construction contracts over $ 2,000. Under this act
laborers and mechanics are to be paid not less often than once a
week. This act does not apply to managerial type workers, or sub-
professional workers such as surveyors.
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9.4 Copeland Act (Anti Kickback Act) (18 USC 874, 40 USC 276c) 63
This act makes it unlawful to induce by force intimidation,
threat of dismissal from employment, or otherwise, any person
employed in federal construction projects to give up any part of
the compensation to which that person is entitled under a contract
of employment. This act also requires contractors and
subcontractors to furnish a statement of compliance with respect
to the wages paid each employee during the preceding week.
9.5 Enforcement of Labor Standards Provisions
Contractors and subcontractors are required to submit weekly
payrolls and statements of compliance for each week in which work
was performed on the project to the contracting officer. 64 The
payroll records shall contain the name, address, social security
number of each worker, his correct job classification, hourly rate
of wages paid (including rates of contributions or costs
anticipated for bona fide fringe benefits or cash equivalents)
,
daily and weekly number of hours worked, deductions made, and
actual wages paid.
The payrolls are a main source of data the contract
administrator can use to determine compliance with the labor laws.
Interviews with the contractor's employees can be used as a method
of verifying the payroll data. Contractors are required to submit
some type of daily report to the contracting officer, the exact
format is usually specified in the general requirements of the
contract. Daily reports on Navy construction contracts contain
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information to be filled in about the number and type of workers
on the job and hours worked. These daily reports can be compared
to the weekly payrolls to ensure consistency. A sample of a daily
report form used on Navy construction contracts is presented in
appendix C.
The contracting officer can withhold payment to a contractor
who fails to submit the required payrolls. 65 The amount of payment
withheld is an amount that the contracting officer feels will
protect the interests of the government and employees of the
contractor or any subcontractor. Payment may also be withheld if
it is found that the contractor underpaid his employees or did not
pay overtime in accordance with the Contract Work Hours and Safety
Standards Act.
9.6 Investigations
The contracting officer is required to perform an
investigation if a compliance check indicated that violations may
have occurred that are substantial in amount, willful, or not
corrected. Simple errors that are discovered and corrected when
brought to the contractors attention are usually dismissed as being
administrative errors if no employee complaints are uncovered. The
investigation is forwarded to the Administrator, Wage and Hour
Division of the Department of Labor within 60 days of the
completion of the investigation.
A contract administrator should be alert to instances in which
daily reports do not reconcile with weekly payroll statements, or
employees that perform work on the project do not appear on any
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payroll for the prime contractor or any of the subcontractors.
If substantial evidence is found that the violations are
willful and in violation of a criminal statute (usually 18 USC 874
or 18 USC 1001, false statements) the report is forwarded to the
Attorney General of the United States for prosecution if the facts
warrant.
There are likely to be disagreements between the contracting
officer's interpretation of the labor laws and the contractor's
interpretation. Such disagreements are not handled in the same
manner as other disputes (Disputes clause, FAR 52.233-1). The
contractor can appeal the contracting officer's findings to the
Administrator, Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor
directly.
9.7 Penalties
A breach of the labor law requirements may be grounds for
terminating a contractor and seeking to debar that contractor from
future contracts for a given period of time as provided for in 2 9
CFR 5.12.
9.8 Employee or Subcontractor ?
Many contractors try to cut costs by claiming that certain
workers are subcontractors and not employees. Contractors are
required to pay workers compensation, social security, and
unemployment insurance for each of their employees. By claiming
that the worker is a subcontractor, the contractor can avoid these
required insurance costs. These insurance costs can often amount
to more than 25 percent of a workers total pay. Contractors that
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try to claim workers are subcontractors have an unfair competitive
advantage and in many cases are probably violating the law.
A worker is considered an employee under the federal tax code
if an employer has the right to discharge the employee and supplies
the employee with tools and a place to work. For an independent
subcontractor, the employer has the right to control or direct only
the result of the work and not the means and methods of
accomplishing the result. As mentioned previously, the contract
administrator should pay attention to the contractor and
subcontractor submitted payrolls to ensure that all workers appear.
Federal contracts also require that all contractors and
subcontractors submit proof of insurance. This is usually
satisfied by the contractor's insurance agency submitting a
certificate of insurance. A certificate of insurance will further
substantiate that a worker is a legitimate subcontractor. Other
simple tests such as noting if the worker has a vehicle with a name
or logo other than that of the prime contractor can be used to
determine if a worker is a subcontractor.
9.9 Closing Thoughts
Enforcement of labor laws adds more work to an often over
worked contract administrator and government inspector. A brief
meeting with the contractor to discuss all labor requirements is
a good idea and is discussed in chapter 13. It is easy to ignore
labor regulations when none of the workers are complaining. The
view that the enforcement of the labor regulations does not add to
the overall quality or timeliness of the project but only takes
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time away from other inspection and administration duties is easy
to develop.
An effective method of enforcement shifts the responsibility
for labor compliance entirely to the contractor where it belongs.
If the contract administrator uses the procedures allowed by the
contract to reject an invoice for payment or withholds a sum of
money when the labor regulations are not being followed, then
contractors will start off with the right attitude towards
complying with the labor laws. The contractor must sense that the
contract administrator and government inspector are committed to
enforcing all of the provisions of the contract.
Prevailing wages are typically only reguired on publicly
funded construction projects. The Davis Bacon Act applies to
federal projects. Many states have similar provisions for their
public works projects. Recently, a number of California localities
began enacting ordinances reguiring contractors to pay prevailing
wages on private projects. 67 This trend has upset many small
contractors that are non-union and do not pay prevailing wages.
The Golden Gate chapter of the Associated Builders and Contractors
(ABC) has challenged the legality of the law in California state
court. This issue is likely to generate many more challengers
should localities try an adopt a requirement for prevailing wages
for private sector jobs.
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CHAPTER 10: MINORITY AND SET ASIDE CONTRACTS
The federal government has made it a policy to obtain a
proportion of its construction needs with small business concerns
and small disadvantaged business concerns.
10.1 Small Business
The size a company can be and still be considered a small
business varies depending on the type of business. 69 General
contractors are considered a small business if they perform less
than $ 17 million per year while for most special trades
contractors $ 7 million is considered a small business. 70
Contracting officers are required to set aside all construction
contracts for small business concerns provided that it can
reasonably be expected to receive offers from at least two
responsible small business concerns and awards will be made at
fair market prices. While this reserving of contracts for only
small business is a set aside of contracts it is still conducted
under competitive conditions under most circumstances using sealed
bidding for a fixed price contract. The main goal in most
government contracts is to promote competition. This goal can
still be achieved with setting aside construction contracts for
small businesses provided that there are enough small businesses
interested in the work. Contractors certify that they are small
businesses when submitting their bid to the contracting officer. 71
The certification is accepted as being correct unless it is
challenged by another contractor or the contracting officer has a
reason to believe that the contractor is not a small business.
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The Small Business Administration (SBA) will make a determination
as to whether the contractor is a small business.
The SBA plays a role in determining if a contractor is
responsible. The contracting officer can perform an investigation
to determine if the contractor meets the responsibility
requirements. If the contracting officer finds the contractor is
not responsible, the contractor can apply to the SBA for a
certificate of competency. A certificate of competency is a
representation by the SBA that the contractor is a responsible
contractor. The SBA sends a team to visit the contractor to
determine if a certificate of competency should be issued.
10.2 Small Business Administration Contracts; 8 (a)
Section 8(a) of the Small Business Act (15 USC 637(a))
established a program that authorizes the SBA to enter into all
types of contracts with agencies and let subcontracts for




The SBA limits program participation to small disadvantaged
business concerns. A small disadvantaged business (SDB) is a
business concern that is at least 51 percent unconditionally owned
by one or more individuals who are both socially and economically
disadvantaged. "Socially disadvantaged" means individuals who have
been subjected to racial or ethnic prejudice or cultural bias
because of their identity as a member of a group without regard to
their qualities as individuals. "Economically disadvantaged" means
socially disadvantaged individuals whose ability to compete in the
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free enterprise system is impaired due to diminished opportunities
to obtain capitol and credit as compared to others in the same line
of business who are not socially disadvantaged. 73 Black Americans,
Hispanic Americans, Asian Pacific Americans, and Subcontinent Asian
Americans, are considered socially and economically disadvantaged.
The SBA determines if a contractor meets the requirements of a
small disadvantaged business.
An "8(a)" contract can either be awarded with competition
limited to 8(a) firms or by sole source procurement (exceptions to
requirements for open competition are mentioned in chapter 2 ) .
An 8(a) contract is actually a three party agreement between the
government, SBA, and the subcontractor. Contracting agencies can
approach the SBA with contracts that they feel are appropriate for
an 8(a) contract, or the SBA may contact various contracting
agencies trying to place an 8(a) contractor with specific skills.
Public law 99-661 set contract goals for minorities within
DOD and permits DOD to use less that full and open competition when
practical and necessary to facilitate an achievement of a goal of
awarding 5 percent of contract dollars to small disadvantaged
businesses providing the contract price does not exceed the fair
market price by more that 10 percent. The SDB is required to
perform 50 percent of the work with his own forces. DOD awarded
only 3.3 percent of its $ 120 billion in prime contracts to SDBs
in fiscal year 1989. Construction contracts carried a larger
percentage of awards to SDBs with 9.8 percent or $ 726.2 million




As was discussed in chapter 3 (bid rigging) , bid prices tend
to increase as competition decreases or vanishes. The 8(a) program
is set up to help small disadvantaged businesses get started and
recognizes that these types of firms, because of the types of
difficulties they experience, are not likely to be low bidders in
an extremely competitive market, thus a 10 percent price buffer is
allowed. For the program to succeed in performing its function a
SDB must eventually become competitive and leave the program. A
SDB is allowed to participate in the program for seven years.
It does not take a lot of insight to realize that 5 percent
of the DOD budget is a lot of money. There are a lot of
contractors that would like to be eligible for that big pot of
money. The requirement that the SDB perform 50 percent of the work
with its own forces does not specify that 50 percent of its
workforce has to be minorities. A serious concern is that
businesses would recruit a minority individual and on paper show
him as 51 percent owner of the company.
10.4 Other Set Aside Programs
Many other public owners (state and local governments) have
contract set aside programs. The qualifications vary from owner
to owner with a common requirement that the agency set aside a
certain percentage of its purchases and public works projects for
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minority firms. The exact definition of which firms qualify as
minority firms also varies. Women are considered minorities by
some owners. Some contractors transfer 51 percent ownership of
their company to their wives to qualify as a minority contractor.
Clearly, this goes against the spirit of minority set aside
programs designed to help minority contractors get established and
eventually compete in the free market.
New Haven, Connecticut has a set aside program that requires
15 percent of any city construction contract to be set aside for
minorities and 6 percent for women. 75 In addition, minorities must
work at the site at least 25 percent of the time and women 6.9
percent. Projects can be shut down for noncompliance. The
enforcement of such provisions has led some contractors to engage
in what is known as "bicycling". Bicycling is the movement of
minorities onto a jobsite or from jobsite to jobsite in order to
satisfy minority contracting requirements. The counting of
minority workers and hours worked can be an administrative
nightmare for a contract administrator.
Grand Rapids, Michigan has a requirement that all contracts
over $ 10,000 will be awarded to the lowest bidder that can
demonstrate that at least 10 percent of work would be performed by
local minority business enterprises. 76
10.5 Case Studies
A recent case in federal district court ruled that the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers and the SBA violated federal law when 100
percent of the Corps projects in a district were set aside for SDBs
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without considering the impact on other firms. The Corps had set
aside 11 projects that represented all of the small business
contracts in the Vicksburg area for 1981. The judge commented that
the set aside "was highly unusual" and "should have invoked a
responsible reaction in accordance with statutory and regulatory
directives and not simply acceptance blinded by zeal or pressure"
to boost minority contracting. This case is different from past
cases brought about by contractors in that the plaintiffs were
precluded from any participation whatsoever. One of the
contractors that brought the suit typically received about six
projects a year from the Corps ranging from $ 750,000 to $ 2
million.
In 1989 in The City of Richmond vs J. A. Croson Co. the U. S.
Supreme Court declared invalid Richmond's minority contracting
program and required localities to document past discrimination in
order to justify their race and sex based contracting programs.
Set aside programs have to be designed to remedy the effects of
proven past discrimination in contracting. The Croson decision did
not affect federal contracting programs. 77
Minority contractors are organizing and bringing suits against
agencies that they feel do not make an effort to award contracts
to minorities. Contractor groups such as the Associated Builders
and Contractors (ABC) are upset about set aside programs claiming
that they lockout non-SDB firms from a substantial portion of the
available construction contracts. Many contractor groups are
challenging local set aside programs in the wake of the Croson
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decision. U.S. District Court Judge Louis Bechtel permanently
enjoined Philadelphia from enforcing its eight year old ordinance
of requiring prime contractors to set aside 27 percent of all
subcontracts for disadvantaged firms, with 15 percent going to
businesses owned by ethnic minorities, 10 percent to women and 2
percent to handicapped.
Atlanta's program of awarding 35 percent of value of city
construction contracts was struck down by Georgia ' s supreme court
shortly after the Croson decision. 79
Not all challenges to set aside programs are successful.
Seattle District Court Judge William J Dwyer upheld King County's
minority and women owned business enterprise plan (MWBE) which
gives MBWEs a 5 percent bid preference.
The Army has discovered several cases of fraud in the past
• 81
several years in contracts under the 8(a) program. At least a
dozen contractors have been charged. Guidelines for the Army Corps
8(a) programs typically require at least 20 percent of the work to
be performed by the minority contractor. Auditors often find a
secret agreement where a minority firm negotiates a contract for
an inflated price and then subcontracts the work to another company
that is not minority owned but is better capitalized. The two then
split the profit. One of the auditors believes that there may be
a systemic problem because many of the 8(a) firms don't possess the
equipment and expertise to do the job. Some minority contractors
perceive the punishment of the fraud as honest contractors being
punished because of a crackdown of inadvertent technical violation
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of federal procurement rules.
10.6 Closing Comments
Proof of prior discrimination is required for a set aside
program to comply with the Croson decision. Many set aside
programs across the country have been challenged and found to be
illegal in accordance with the Croson decision. In Atlanta, the
minority contractors share of city contracts fell from 3 6 percent
op
in the first third of 1989 to 14.5 percent in the last third.
Set aside programs will continue to be a controversial issue
and will likely continue to generate challenges across the country.
Contract administrators need to be alert to ensure that minority
firms that are afforded special opportunities are legitimate firms




Chapter 11; CONSTRUCTION SAFETY
11.1 Responsibility for Safety
Each employer shall furnish to each of his employees,
employment and a place of employment which are free from recognized
83 •hazards. Under federal construction contracts, contractors are
responsible for complying with all federal, state, and municipal
laws applicable to the performance of the work. The contractor is
also responsible to take proper safety and health precautions to
protect the work, the workers, the public, and the property of
others.
The Secretary of Labor has issued safety standards that govern
the construction industry ( 29 CFR 1926, and 29 CFR 1910 )
,
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accident prevention clause of federal construction contracts
incorporates the above OSHA regulations by reference into the
construction contract. The clause also requires that contractors
working on Department of Defense construction contracts comply with
the U.S. Army Corp of Engineers Safety and Health Requirements
Manual, EM 385-1-1. The EM 385-1-1 is a comprehensive manual and
a good practical portable reference source to be used by the
government inspector in verifying a contractor's compliance with
appropriate safety measures.
The EM 385-1-1 lists several general requirements that are
worth mentioning:
1) An acceptable accident prevention plan written by the prime
contractor for the specific work and implementing in detail the




2) The accident prevention plan shall provide for frequent and
regular safety inspections of the work sites, materials, and
equipment by competent persons. 87
3) An activity hazard analysis shall be prepared by the
contractor for each phase of work. The analysis will address the
hazards for each activity performed in that phase and will
present the procedures and safeguards necessary to eliminate the
hazards or reduce the risk to an acceptable level. 88
4) Each employee shall be provided initial indoctrination and
such continued safety training to enable them to perform their
work in a safe manner. 89
5) At least one safety meeting shall be conducted weekly by
field supervisors or foremen for all workers. 90
Enforcement of the requirements of the EM 385-1-1 will force
contractors to plan and think about the safety aspects of the work.
An awareness and emphasis of safety will lead to a safer job site.
Job site safety in and of itself is not an item that is
recognizable in the finished construction project. Accident costs
in construction are estimated at 6.5 percent of total construction
costs. 91 Accident costs will be passed on to the owner in the form
of higher costs on future projects. A survey of a large number of
contractors revealed that approximately 2.5 percent of direct labor
costs was required to administer a construction safety and health
program. 92 The contractors that were part of the survey had
recordable injury rates of only 36 percent of the average rate of
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the construction industry as published by the National Safety
Council (NSC) . These same contractors had an OSHA lost workday
rate of only 2.7 percent of the average rate published by the NSC.
A study of owners in regards to safety of construction projects was
conducted by Stanford University. 9 Owners with better than average
construction safety records:
1) Require contractors to obtain work permits for specific
activities (ie open flame burning, confined space entry)
.
2) Consider contractor's safety record in awarding a negotiated
contract.
3) Conduct formal site inspections.
4) Use some form of goal setting for contractors to reduce
accidents.
5) Keep statistics separately by contractor.
6) Have construction safety department to monitor and confer
with contractor on job site safety.
7) Stress safety as necessary part of job.
8) Are involved in training sessions for construction site
supervisors and workers.
In order for a contractor's safety program to work, it must
have commitment from top management. Government contracts make
safety part of the contract requirement, and thus all contractors
should anticipate providing a safe work environment and allow for
that in formulating their bid. Safety is part of the contract, and
as such should be enforced by the government inspector not only for




The government inspector or contract administrator has the
right to stop the work of a contractor that is not complying with
the appropriate safety standards. Only the work that is deemed to
be unsafe should be stopped otherwise the contractor may have a
cause to claim that the project is being delayed unjustly by the
government
.
11.2 Specialized Work: Asbestos Example
Some types of work such as asbestos removal require special
training and licenses granted by a government agency. Maryland
requires all contractors performing asbestos removal to provide a
minimum amount of training to their employees and be licensed to
perform asbestos removal. Licensing is no guarantee that a
contractor will operate in a safe manner. An asbestos removal
license can be obtained in Maryland by submitting a nominal fee
(less than $ 300) and showing that the employees have had training
in the hazards involved in asbestos removal. Asbestos removal is
a specialized operation and very few owners have the expertise to
inspect the contractor's work to insure compliance with OSHA safety
regulations. Many government agencies concerned with the risks of
exposure to asbestos have provided large amounts of money to be
used for asbestos removal contracts. Entering the asbestos removal
business does not require large amounts of capital. The author has
seen the number of companies in the asbestos removal business grow
very rapidly in the past few years as indicated by the increasing
number of contractors that bid upon asbestos removal work. As a
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result of the large number of contractors and the relative ease of
entering the asbestos business, the author has witnessed wide
variations in the quality of work performed by asbestos removal
contractors. State officials who regulate the asbestos removal
business are few and far between. The best way an owner can ensure
a safe job site in regards to asbestos removal is to become
educated as to the specific requirements or retain a representative
who is familiar with the requirements. The owner will also
directly benefit by maintaining a safe job site with a decrease in
liability that is associated with asbestos removal projects.
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CHAPTER 12: CLAIMS AND REMEDIES
12.1 Contract Disputes Act
A claim in the context of government contracting means a
written demand or written assertion by one of the contracting
parties seeking as a matter of right, the payment in a sum certain,
the adjustment or interpretation of contract terms, or other relief
arising under or relating to the contract. 94
The Contract Disputes Act of 1978 ( 41 USC 601-603) sets forth
procedures for asserting and resolving claims by or against
contractors. The act also states that a contractor must certify
any claim in excess of $ 50, 000. 94 The certification states that
the claim is made in good faith, that supporting data are accurate
and complete to the best of the contractor's knowledge and belief,
and the amount requested accurately reflects the contract
adjustment for which the contractor believes the government is
liable. The act also provides for a civil penalty for any claims
that are found to be fraudulent or based on a misrepresentation of
fact.
12.2 Disputes Clause 96
Federal contracts contain a disputes clause which explains the
procedures to be followed by the contractor in settling a contract
dispute. All disputes are to be settled by using the procedures
of this clause.
Any claim by the contractor is to be made in writing and
submitted to the contracting officer for a written decision. The
contracting officer must issue a written decision within 60 days
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for any claim under $ 50,000, and either issue a decision or inform
the contractor of a date by which a decision will be made for any
claim over $ 50,000. The contractor is bound by the contracting
officer's decision unless he appeals. The contractor is also
required to proceed with the performance of the contract while
awaiting a contracting officer's decision.
12.3 Appealing a Contracting Officer's Decision
The contractor can appeal the contracting officer's decision
to the government agency's board of contract appeals (BCA) . In the
case of the Department of Defense it would be the Armed Services
Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) . An appeal to an agency BCA must
be made within 90 days from the date a contractor receives a
written contracting officer's decision.
Alternatively, the contractor can appeal the contracting
officer's decision to the U. S. Claims Court. This appeal must be
made within one year of receiving a contracting officer's decision.
The BCA and U. S. Claims Court decisions may be appealed to the U.
S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. ( 60 days for Claims
Court appeal and 12 days for BCA appeal) . A flow chart of the
disputes process for Department of Defense contracts is presented
in appendix D.
12.4 Cause of Disputes
Below is a list of some of the frequent causes of contract
disputes:
1) Differing site conditions.
2) Delay in approving contractor submittals.
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3) Disagreement in specification requirement (level of effort
required, quality, etc.).
4) Disagreement over price of modification.
5) Owner delay of job.
6) Rejection of work.
Dealing with a dispute over differences in contract
interpretations is perhaps the easiest. Many disputes are rooted
in an unharmonious relationship between the contractor and owner.
The latter types of disputes tend to become emotional with each
party feeling a need to defend its actions. The dispute becomes
a matter of one party's actions or lack of action rather than a
focus on the contract language.
12.5 Alternative Disputes Resolution
Using the contract disputes procedure may require a large
amount of time before the case is heard and a significant amount
of money in legal fees for the contractor. In the private sector
arbitration has long been recognized as an alternative disputes
resolution and is specified in article 7.9 of the American
Institute of Architect's general conditions of the contract for
construction.
Arbitration is not used in federal contracts. The Contract
Disputes Act requires contracting officers to issue a decision and
provides a procedure to appeal the contracting officer's decision
as discussed above.
Mediation is also used in the private sector. Mediation
differs from arbitration in that both parties retain the power to
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make decisions. The mediator acts as a neutral third party to help
each party understand the other party's stand on the issues.
A new form of mediation called a minitrial is being used in
some federal contracts. In a minitrial, a short hearing is
conducted (about a day) in which a representative from both sides
presents evidence in support of his position concerning the claim.
It is sometimes better to have parties that were not involved in
the claim present the argument for their side as some claims become
emotional battles. The mediator helps each party articulate his
position and understand the other's position.
In any type of litigation there is a risk of losing. The
minitrial is designed to present the views of each side in a manner
that an equitable settlement can be reached without having to
endure the risk of losing in court.
12.5a ADR Example97
The Bureau of Reclamation recently settled a claim for $55.8
million using the alternative disputes resolution. This is the
largest claim settlement ever reached by the Department of Interior
under an ADR method. The project was a $44.8 million contract to
build a flood control project on the Pecos river near Carlsbad, New
Mexico. Both sides were swayed by what was expected to be an 8
week court hearing and a possible 3 year wait for final resolution.
The contract did not contain provisions for alternative claim
resolution. The case was scheduled to be heard before the
Department of Interior's board of contract appeals. The board
contacted both sides and asked if they would consider ADR. The ADR
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allowed for a speedy solution to the problem.
12.6 Remedies of the Government
Throughout this paper various aspects of the contracting
process have been discussed and examples have been cited to show
how some contractors and owners violate the contract and in some
cases by fraudulent behavior, the law. The government has legal
rights that can be pursued in regards to contract violations and
illegal actions. Some of these rights and remedies of the
government were discussed in chapters dealing with specific
subjects (material and workmanship (chapter 5) , truth in
negotiations (chapter 6) , payment practices (chapter 7) , contract
safety (chapter 11) )
.
12.6a False. Fictitious, or Fraudulent Claims Act (18 USC 287)
The False, Fictitious, or Fraudulent Act makes it illegal to
make any false, fictitious, or fraudulent claim against any agency
or department of the United States. The crime is committed when
the claim is presented. Payment of the claim is not an element in
determining if a crime has been committed. Violators
of the act can be fined up to one million dollars and imprisoned
up to five years.
12.6b False Claims Act (31 USC 3729)
Under the False Claims Act a civil penalty of $5,000 - $ 10,000
plus three times the amount of damages sustained by the government
may be invoked for contractors that knowingly submit a false claim
to the government for payment. The difference in the two acts is
that the False Claims Act provides civil penalties less severe than
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the criminal penalties of the False, Fictitious, or Fraudulent
Claims Act.
The False Claims Act defines when a false claim is submitted
knowingly:
1) If a person has actual knowledge that it is false or,
2) Acts in deliberate ignorance of whether it is true or false
or,
3) Acts in reckless disregard of its truth or falsity.
A contractor can be charged under both the criminal and civil
statutes. For prosecution under the criminal false claims statute,
the offender must have actual knowledge.
The Contract Disputes Act of 1978 (P L 95-563) states that if
a contractor cannot support any part of his claim and it is
determined that the inability is due to misrepresentation of fact
or fraud on the contractor's part, he will be liable to the
government for an amount equal to such unsupported part of his
claim and also for the government's cost of reviewing his claim.
The act also states that the agency contracting officer does not
have the authority to settle claims involving fraud.
12.6c False Statements
The False Statements Act, 18 USC 1001, makes it illegal to
.99
•
1) Falsify, conceal, or cover up a material fact by trick,
scheme or device.





3) Make or use any false document or writing.
An example of a violation would include a contractor falsifying
an inspection report. A false statement can be oral or written.
Violators of the act can be fined up to $10,000 and imprisoned for
up to five years.
12. 6d Mail Fraud
The Mail Fraud Act, 18 USC 1341 makes it illegal to engage in
any scheme to defraud in which the mail is used. Examples include
using the mail to submit a false claim or statement.
12. 6e Program Civil Remedies Act (31 USC 3801)
The Department of Justice does not have the time and/or
resources to prosecute every case of fraud. The DOJ usually only
pursues those cases that involve large sums of money or have a
deterrent value. This act establishes administrative procedures
for resolving allegations of false claims for amounts less than $
150,000. These procedures require an investigation by an official
in the Office of the Inspector General for the agency. 100 The
report made by the official is sent to a high level reviewing
official of the agency. If there is sufficient evidence to believe
that the contractor is liable, the reviewing official submits a
written summary to the attorney general. The attorney general must
approve or disapprove the written decision within 90 days. Upon
approval, the matter is referred to a presiding officer for
discovery, in which each party obtains evidence from the other, and
a hearing. After the hearing, the presiding officer issues a
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decision which includes findings of fact and conclusions of law.
The decision is final unless the contractor appeals to the agency
head within 3 days.
For each false claim that the government has paid, the
contractor is liable to reimburse the government up to twice the
claim plus a $ 5,000 civil penalty.
12. 6f Bribery of Public Officials (18 USC 201) 1Q1
Whoever, directly or indirectly, corruptly gives, offers or
promises anything of value to any public official or person who has
been selected to be a public official, or offers or promises any
public official, or any person who has been selected to be a public
official to give anything of value to any other person or entity,
with intent:
1) To influence any official act or,
2) To influence such public official or person who has been
selected to be a public official to commit or collude in, or
allow, any fraud, or make opportunity for the commission of any
fraud, on the United States; or,
3) To induce such public official or such person who has been
selected to be a public official to do or omit to do any act in
violation of his lawful duty. .
.
shall be fined not more than $ 20,000 or three times the monetary
equivalent of the thing of value, whichever is greater, or
imprisoned for not more than fifteen years, or both, and may be
disqualified from holding any office of honor, trust, or profit
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under the United States. The penalties under this statute also
apply to the person who accepts the bribe.
12.6a Anti Kickback Act of 1986
The Anti Kickback Act was discussed in chapter 4 . Violators
of this act are subject to civil penalties of twice the kickback
plus $10,000 for each occurrence and up to ten years in prison.
Additionally, contracting officers can deduct from the contractor's
payment any amount used to pay kickbacks.
12.7 Intent to Commit Fraud
The application of any of the penalties is a legal process.
The above discussion was provided to help understand the penalties
of committing fraud under a government contract and not meant to
be a comprehensive step by step guide of actions to be taken by a
contracting officer. Contracting agencies have legal counsel
available for the contracting officer to consult for legal
guidance. In many cases, a contractor's claim may contain errors.
This is not automatically an indicator of fraud. A key in
prosecuting a contractor under the above mentioned statutes is in
many cases proving that the contractor willingly and knowingly
intended to deceive the government. The above mentioned statutes
help to maintain public confidence in the government procurement
process.
12.8 Debarment
Debarment is an action the government can take to ensure that
government contracts are awarded only to responsible contractors.
The following are reasons for debarment:
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1) Commission of fraud or a criminal offense in connection with
obtaining, attempting to obtain, or performing a public contract
or subcontract.
2) Violation of Federal or State antitrust statutes relating to
the submission of offers.
3) Commission of embezzlement, theft, forgery, bribery,
falsification or destruction of records, making false statements,
or receiving stolen property.
4) Commission of any other offense indicating a lack of business
integrity or business honesty that seriously and directly affects
the present responsibility of a government contractor or
subcontractor
.
5) Willful failure to perform in accordance with the terms of
one or more contracts
6) A history of failure to perform, or of unsatisfactory
performance of, one or more contracts.
7) Violations of the Drug-Free-Workplace Act of 1988 (Public Law
100-690)
The period of debarment generally does not exceed three years
and depends upon the seriousness of the violation. Violation of
the Drug-Free-Workplace Act may result in debarment for up to five
years. 103
12.9 Ineligibility
Some statutes specify that any contractor that violates its
provisions will be ineligible for future contracts. Violations of
the Davis Bacon Act and the Buy American Act will result in a

91
contractor being ineligible for future contracts.
12.10 Prevention of Claims
One way to significantly reduce false and fraudulent claims
is to prevent a claim from occurring. Contract administrators do
not have total control over whether or not a dispute develops on
a particular contract, but can reduce the chances of a claim by
practicing proactive contract administration.
All obstructions to a contractor's progress must be removed.
This is a general statement but encompasses a wide area.
Government inspection personnel must not overinspect a contractor's
work or cause excessive delays during inspection. Approval for a
contractor's submittals should be granted or denied in a reasonable
period of time (three weeks is considered reasonable for most
submittals unless they are of an extremely complicated nature)
.
The government will have to pay for any of the contractor's
delays that are not self imposed or excusable under the defaults
clause of the contract (FAR 52.249-10). Proactive contract
administration means closely monitoring situations in which a delay
or dispute may occur and working to prevent the occurrence.
If a dispute is inevitable, proper documentation of the facts
during the delay period or dispute should be recorded. The nature
of the work and extent affected should be documented.
Contemporaneous records of delay will be more accurate and carry
more weight than allegations of its effect put together many months
after the delay or dispute occurred.
The contract administrator should try to settle a dispute
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based on the facts as recorded and their effect on the contractor.
By being objective, the contract administrator can try to negotiate




This paper has looked at a number of fraudulent practices that
can occur at various stages during the construction process. If
both contracting parties (owner and contractor including
subcontractors) are aware of the expectations of fairness placed
upon them and the consequences for violating the rules, then the
opportunity for fraud to occur can be greatly reduced.
13.1 Getting Started with the Right Attitude
Federal contracting officers are required to have a meeting
with the contractor before construction commences (usually termed
preconstruction conference) to inform the contractor concerning the
labor standards clauses of the contract. 04 The preconstruction
conference is a good time to discuss the "ground rules" that the
contractor must follow while performing the contract. The author
has prepared a standard agenda of items to be discussed at
preconstruction conferences based upon three years of experience
in administrating construction contracts at the United States Naval
Academy. The preconstruction agenda is presented in appendix E.
Most of the "ground rules" are spelled out in the text of the
contract in the general requirements or are requirements that are
incorporated by reference. The author's experience indicates that
a substantial number of contractors do not read or understand their
contract obligations. The preconstruction conference lasts between
one and one and a half hours and serves the sole purpose of
acquainting the contractor with the government requirements and
procedures. The conference is not a technical question and answer
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session as this could turn into a long and controversial meeting.
13.2 Equal Treatment for all Contractors
A contract administrator or inspector after reading about the
types of fraud discussed in this paper should be able to recognize
the indicators of such activity and understand the appropriate
action to take.
The integrity of the contracting system must be protected.
To assure this, all contractors must be treated equally and fairly,
and the rules must be enforced uniformly for all. A system that
favors one contractor over another will discourage honest
contractors from bidding. The terms of the contract should be
fair. Some owners write contracts that place all of the risk for
an unknown condition on the contractor. These types of contracts
will encourage a contractor to cut costs if he encounters an
unforseen site condition which increases his cost and for which he
knows he will not be compensated. These unfair contracts also tend
to discourage contractors from bidding and limit competition.
13.3 Guidelines for Contract Administration
During the author's three years at the United States Naval
Academy, several courses of action were noted to contribute to
quality construction with a minimum of problems:
1) Maintaining a professional relationship with the contractor
This means treating the contractor fairly and being consistent
in administrating policy (even if the contractor is not well liked
or is performing poorly) . Being consistent and fair will earn the
respect of the contractor. The contractor may not agree with all
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decisions but he will know what to expect and what course of action
to pursue in regards to the decision. A professional relationship
also means that the government standards of conduct are followed
at all times in any relationship with a contractor.
2) Familiarity with requirements of project and terms of
contract
There is no substitute for knowing the requirements of the contract
and the provisions of the contract that give the contract
administrator the authority to enforce the contract.
3) Inspection of work
Frequent appearances on the jobsite, but at unpredictable times,
will convey to the contractor that there is a great likelihood that
he will be caught if the work does not conform to the requirements
of the contract and that the risk will not be worth taking.
4) Conveying to the contractor an attitude that quality work in
accordance with the specifications is expected and nothing short
of that will be accepted.
This does not mean to constantly be on the contractor's back
or overinspecting the work and interfering with the contractor's
progress. A contract administrator should hold the contractor to
the terms of the contract. This is an important responsibility of
the contract administrator as it maintains the integrity of the
contracting system. All contractors must be expected to perform
to the same standards, anything less would not be fair to the
contractors that did not win the bid. These contractors could
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argue that they would have been the low bidder had they been
allowed to perform at a standard less than that specified.
13.4 Integrity of Federal Construction Contracting System
Government contracting is different from private sector
contracting in that many social goals are promoted through
contracting. The enforcement of these social goals requires
additional effort from the contract administrator but is also
important in maintaining the integrity of the contracting system.
It is important that when the contractor or contract administrator
is found to have violated the rules or law in regards to a contract
action that appropriate action be taken. A contracting system that
does not take corrective measures will be viewed by the public as
wasteful and corrupt. Contractors will be discouraged from bidding
in such a system for fear that they will not be treated fairly.
A lack of bidders will increase the price of the work. The types
of contractors that bid will probably contribute to further
contracting problems.
The author believes that the federal construction contracting
system is fair to contractors and provides construction for the
federal government in an efficient manner that is free from bias
and corruption. The federal construction contracting procurement
system is open to the public and subject to review at all stages
with very limited exceptions (typically in matters of national
security) . This openness in itself prevents many forms of contract
fraud. It is true that isolated incidences of corruption and fraud
do exist. This is not a sign of weakness or of a failure of the
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contracting system. There are laws and regulations that prescribe
actions to be taken when violations occur. In many instances,
contract fraud is viewed as a white collar crime and probation or
lenient sentences are handed out to violators that are caught and
convicted. Judges need to hand out more stringent sentences to
discourage contractors and procurement personnel from participating
in illegal activities.
By recognizing the signs of fraud and following the
recommendations discussed in this paper, contract administrators
and inspection personnel can create an atmosphere of trust between
the government and contractor. This will lead to a quality job

























CONTRACT TITLE: CONTRACT NO:
ROICC OFFICE:
DESCRIPTION:
PRIME CONTRACTOR'S WORK Revisions/Comments
1 . Direct Materials





4. Insurance, Taxes, and Fringe Benefits % of line 3 % lllllllllillllllllllllllir
5. Rental Equipment llllllllllllllllll llllllllllllllllllllllllll
6. Sales Tax on Rental Equipment % of line 5
7. Equioment Ownership and Operating Expenses
8. SUBTOTAL (add lines 1 • 7)
9. Field Overhead 1 0.00% of line 8








1 1 . Direct Matenals llllllllllllllllll llllllllllllllllllllllllll
1 2. Sales Tax on Materials % of Pine 1
1
% llllllllllllllllllllllllll
13. Direct Labor llllllllllllllllll llllllllllllllllllllllllll
14. Insurance, Taxes, and Fringe Benefits % of line 13 % llllllllllllllllllllllllll
1 5. Rental Equipment llllllllllllllllll llllllllllllllllllllllllll
16. Sales Tax on Rental Equipment % of line 15 % lllllllllllllllllllllllllfl
1 7. Equipment Ownership and Operating Expenses llllllllllllllllll llllllllllllllllllllllllll
18. SUBTOTAL (add lines 11-17) llllllllllllllllll llllllllllllllllllllllllll
19. Field Overhead 10.00% of line 18 % lllllllllllllllllllllllllfl
20. SUBTOTAL (add lines 18 & 19) llllllllllllllllll llllllllllllllllllllllllll
21. Home Office Overhead 3.00% of line 20 % llllllllllllllllllllllllll
22. Profit % of line 20 % llllllllllllllllllllllllll
23. SUBTOTAL (Add Lines 20 - 22) llllllllllllllllll llllllllllllllllllllllllll
Sub's Remarks:
SUMMARY
24. Prime Contractor's Work (from line 10) llllllllllllllllll llllllllllllllllllllllllll
25. Sub-contractor's Work (from line 23) llllllllllllllllll IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIHIP
26. SUBTOTAL (add lines 24 & 25) llllllllllllllllll llllllllllllllllllllllllll
27. Prime Overhead on sub-contractor 5.00% of line 25 %
28. Prime's Home Office Overhead 3.00% of line 24 % llllllllllllllllllllllllll!
29. Prime's Profit % of line 26 % llllllllllllllllllllllllll
30. SUBTOTAL (add lines 26 - 29) llllllllllllllllll llllllllllllllllllllllllll
31. Prime Contractor's Bond Premium % of line 30 % llllllllllllllllllllllllll
32. TOTAL COST (Add Lines 30 & 32) llllllllllllllllll llllllllllllllllllllllllll
Estimated time extension and justification
Prime Contractor name:
Sub-contractor name:




INSTRUCTIONS FOR PREPARING PROPOSAL/ESTIMATE FOR CONTRACT MODIFICATION
T
intact Modification Proposals shall be aadressad to the Resident Officer in Charge of Construction. Proposals must clearly state
girtions and scope of the modrfication and shall be accompanied by a breaKdown of cost, as indicated. Lump sum costs will not
ot ed in either the prime or sub-contractor's breakdown of direct cost The total cost for labor, material, and equipment rental
jrship) for each item shall be transferred to the corresponding item on the front of this form. At the contractors option, the
id rates printed on the front of this form may be used for proposals under $ 500,000 in lieu of detailed itemized estimates of
id costs. The proposal should also include a request for an extension of time, in calendar days, only if overall completion of
i is impacted by the proposed modification. The contractor shall not proceed with any of the work included in the modification
receipt of an executed modification of contract (SF30).
EAKDOWN OF DIRECT COSTS Contract No. Date:
ITEMS OF WOHK FOR
Prim* Contractor
QTY UNIT MATERIAL
Unit Cost Total Cost
LABOR





HRECT Prime Contractor's TOTALS Total (Rental)
O ( Total (Own eo) |
ITEMS OF WORK FOR
Sub-contractor
QTY UNIT MATERIAL
Unrt Cost Total Cost
LABOR
Unrt Cost Total Cost
EQUIPMENT
Days Rate Total
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* 4330/34 (BEV 2-*7) S/N 0105-LF-003-3172 105
DAILY REPORT TO INSPECTOR DATE
\C1 NO. TITLE AND LOCATION REPORT NO.




provide below is inadequate, use additional sheets) LOCATION AND DESCRIPTION
OF WORK PERFORMED





THIS DATE WERE THERE ANY LOST TIME ACCIDENTS THIS DATE?
YES 1 1 NO
IF '•YES", A COPY OF THE COMPUETED OSHA REPORT IS REQUIRED




CONSTRUCTION AND PLANT EQUIPMENT LEFT ON JOB SITE UNTIL USE IS COMPLETED
CRIPTION




HOURS IDLED DATE OF FINAL
REMOVAL FROM JOB SITE
-
CONSTRUCTION AND PLANT EQUIPMENT NOT LEFT ON JOB SITE PEMMANI NTLY
(This will include pickup tnicks and mobile mounted items, such as compressor, tli.ii .w also
used for transprotation to and from the pb)





LOCATION AND DESCRIPTION OF Dl FICIENCIES
(Materials. Equipment. Safety, and/or Workmanship) ACTION TAKEN < IR TO [IF TAKFN
REFERENCE







PERFORMED TODAY-FOLLOW WITH REPORT
LOCATION AND/OR











EMARKS (Include drections received from ROICC/ARC)ICC, visitors, compliance notices received, errors and/or ommtssion in P/S; pertinent information)
CONTRACTOR/SUPERINTENDENT DATE
INSTRUCTION REPRESENTATIVE'S REMARKS AND/OR EXCEPTIONS TO THIS REPORT
CONSTRUCTION REPRESENTATIVE DATE

















































RECORD OF PRECONSTRUCTION CONFERENCE
Subj : Contract #
1. At , a preconstruction conference was held in
the office of the Officer in Charge/Resident Officer in Charge of
Construction for the purpose of discussing preconstruction details
with the contractor. Present at this meeting were:
Contractor Personnel Government Personnel
2 . Administrative matters
a) Contract number
, ( )
was awarded on for $ with a completion date of
and liquidated damages of $ per day.




c) The contractor will provide a listing of key personnel for
prime and subcontractors with telephone numbers.
d) An explanation of the ROICC organization and procedures was
made, i.e., the Officer in Charge of Construction/Resident
Officer in Charge of Construction is solely responsible for
authorizing changes in the contract plans and specifications and
for administering the contract through his authorized
representatives. It was explained to the contractor that the
inspector has all of the authority necessary to see that the work
is completed within the requirements of the plans and
specifications but has no authority concerning change order
matters affecting time and price or contractor's methods or
procedures as long as they conform to the plans and
specifications and to safe construction practices.
e) The contractor's superintendent shall be on the job site at
all times and have the authority to act for the contractor.
(FAR 52.236-6)
f) Base parking passes can be obtained at the pass and tag
office near gate three. Be prepared to present vehicle
registration, proof of insurance, social security number, date
of birth, etc.
g) The base number in case of any emergency is 267-3333 or 3333
from any base phone.
h) Any correspondence shall reference the contract number.
3 . Preconstruction requirements
a) Insurance certificates shall be submitted to ROICC for
prime and subcontractors. Types and amounts of insurance and
wording of cancellation clause shall be as described in general
paragraphs of specification, paragraph 1.5 . No work shall be
preformed until insurance certificates are received.
b) Schedule of prices shall be submitted. (NAVFAC form 4330/4) no
payment will be processed until it is received. (sample enclosed)
c) Contractors schedule of work shall be submitted. No payment
will be processed until it is received. (FAR 52.236-15)
d) Payment and performance bonds shall be approved before any work
starts.
e) The contractor expects to start work on
.
f) The contractor's normal work hours shall be
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Work outside of normal contract work hours requires advance
notification of the ROICC office. (General paragraphs, paragraph
2.1.2)
h) The contractor shall provide advance notice of utility outages,
obstructions to traffic, and any operations which impact on the
customers or the public.
i) Location of a field trailer and storage shall be as indicated
on the plans and specifications or as arranged by the Contracting
Officer. (Additional General Paragraphs, paragraph 2.1.2, FAR
52.236-10)
4. Safety (FAR 52.236-13)
a) Army Corp of Engineer's Manual EM-385-1-1 APR87
Manual can be obtained from: Superintendent of Documents
US Government Printing Office
Washington DC 20402
(202) 783-3238
b) EM-385-1-1 section 1 (Instruction and Training) requires the
contractor to submit a job specific accident prevention plan.
Appendix y offers help in preparing the plan.
c) Hot permits are required for any cutting/welding and are issued
by the fire department, 267-3331 or 3331 from any base phone.
d) Any accidents shall be reported on OSHA form 101.
e) Some common safety violations:
1) Improper personnel protective equipment,
minimum short sleeve shirt, long pants, and work shoes.
2) Not using safety glasses during cutting and grinding.
3) Improper use of ladder or scaffolding.
4) Frayed and Worn extension cords.
5) Failure to wear safety harness when working at heights.
6) Refer to enclosed check list for other precautions.
f) Job site clean up shall be performed daily. (FAR 52.236-12)





a) Schedule shall be submitted by contractor prior to starting
work.
b) Updated copy must be submitted with each invoice and when
required by major changes in the work, or progress payments will
be withheld. (FAR 52.236-15)
c) Progress schedule should be annotated to the various classes
of work broken down into:
1) Time projected for submittals, approval and procurement.
2) Time for installation and erection.
3) Time for testing and inspection.
6. Payment (FAR 52.232-5. DFAR 52.232-7005)
a) Invoice for payment shall be submitted on NAVFAC invoice forms
provided to the contractor .
b) Contractor superintendent and construction representative will
agree on work in place and material on site before invoice is
submitted.
c) Payment shall be made only for satisfactory work.
d) No payment will be processed without a schedule of prices.
1) Submit on NAVFAC 4330/4.
2) Use only work items, (spread mobilization over other items
,
unless exceptionally high)
3) If mobilization is allowed, then demobilization must also be
included on schedule of prices.
4) Work items must be broken down into material and labor
components
.
e) Payrolls must be current and certified or payment will not be
processed.
f) Payment for stored materials shall be in accordance with
contract specifications. If stored materials are to billed, then
a seperated sheet must be attached listing the material that is
stored at the work site. The contractor shall also provide
receipts for the material. An amount not to exceed 85% will be
paid for stored materials provided that the above requirements are
met and that the materials are adequately protected.
g) Final release must be submitted before final payment can be
processed.




1) If a retention is withheld, the next invoice shall indicate
on line D of the Contractor's Invoice form the amount billed for
to date in the last invoice not the amount that has been paid to
the contractor to date.
2) The retention shall be released upon satifactory completion
of the work or at the end of the contract performance period




a) To be followed by contractor at all times during performance
of contract.
b) 11 provisions are included in text in contract.
8 Submittals (General paragraphs, section 01010, paragraph 1.9)
a) All submittals shall refer to the specification section and
paragraph to which it pertains.
b) Samples are also to be accompanied by complete information.
General Requirements sections usually list the detail required in
a submittal i.e. mechanical general requirements section 15011,
and electrical general requirements section 16011.
c) Submit number of copies as indicated in specifications or
requested by Contracting Officer.
d) Contractor to certify that submittals conform to contract
requirements and can be installed in the allocated spaces.
e) Any deviations shall be noted and submitted in writing for
ROICC approval.
f) Incomplete submittals shall be returned without processing.
g) Time for submittal approval shall be allowed in the
construction schedule (three weeks in most cases will be
sufficient, longer times may be necessary for more complex items)
.
h) All material shall be new unless specified otherwise (FAR
52.236-5)
.






a) Contractor Daily reports by 10 am following day (specification
section 01010 paragraph 1.10).
b) Payrolls.
1) Submit weekly in accordance with wage decision included in
contract documents.
2) Must be accompanied by statement of compliance.
3) Wage interviews will be conducted on contractor employees.
4) Progress payments will not be processed if contractor falls
behind in submitting payrolls.
5) Final payment will not be made until all payrolls are received.
10. Modifications
a) Cost estimates shall be submitted on NAVFAC form 4330/43.
(enclosed with request for proposal)
b) Contractor shall breakdown costs of work (also includes
subcontractors) DFARS 52.236-7001.
c) Time extensions for material delays shall be in accordance with
FAR 52.249-10. (DPAS manual)
d) Unforseen conditions. (FAR 52.236-2)
contractor shall immediately notify the Contracting Officer in
writing before conditions are disturbed of how conditions differ
materially from those indicated in the contract.
11. Contract closeout
a) All daily reports and payrolls are current.
b) All manuals are submitted.
c) Punchlist complete.




a) A contractor's performance evaluation will be filled out by
the ROICC office upon the completion of this contract.
b) The following elements will be evaluated:
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1) Quality of work.
2) Timely performance.
3) Effectiveness of management.
4) Compliance with labor standards.
5) Compliance with safety standards.
13. Additional Items
a) The following concerns were discussed
Sincerely,
J E Gentry
By Direction of the Resident








Agency head - The Secretary (or Attorney General, Administrator,
Governor, Chairperson, or other chief official, as appropriate) of
the government agency.
Allowable costs - Costs that a contractor incurs in the performance
of a project or running his company that may be passed on to the
government. Some costs such as entertainment are not allowable
ANSI - American National Standards Institute, an organization that
sets performance standards for various materials and products.
Arbitration - A dispute resolution process in which a neutral third
party listens to the case of each party involved in the dispute and
decides how to resolve the dispute.
ASTM - American society for testing and materials, an organization
that sets standard test procedures to be followed for testing
materials.
Base contract - The basic form of the contract that is awarded to
the contractor, the original contract not including modifications.
Contracting agency - A part of the government that has the
authority to enter into contracts
Contract clauses - Clauses that state the rights of one or both of
the contracting parties (government and contractor) in regards to
a particular area. I.E. differing sites condition clause,
Inspection clause.
Contraction officer - The government official that has the
authority to enter into, administer, and/or terminate contracts and
make related determinations and findings.
Contracting officer's decision - A determination made by the
contracting that expresses the governments position on an issue
submitted by the contractor or contract administrator. The first
step of the disputes process when a contractor submits a claim that
cannot be settled in an agreeable manner.
Debarred - To be prohibited, usually for a set amount of time, from
bidding on government contracts or participating in any manner in
a government contract (i.e. supplier or subcontractor)
.
Equitable adjustment - An appropriate modification of the amount
due under a contract, or the time required for its performance,
because of the issuance of a change order, which is just, fair and




Formal advertising - Sealed bidding with no restrictions on
competition
Gratuities - Something of value that is given voluntarily without
obligation. Gratuities are usually given to gain favor or
influence.
Laborer - A non skilled employee that performs work at the jobsite.
This work may not be of the type that a mechanic performs.
Examples of laborer tasks include: cleanup, material handling,
manual excavation. Work usually does not involve the use of tools
requiring special skills or training.
Mechanic - A skilled employee that performs work at the jobsite.
Wage determination will classify the different types of mechanic,
i.e. pipe fitter, electrician, etc.. Supervisory, managerial, and
sub-professional employees (surveyors, clerks, etc.) are not
considered mechanics.
Mutual mistake - A mistake in which both parties to a contract
share an erroneous belief concerning the basis for the contract.
Example: A contract that is written and does not reflect the terms
actually agreed to by the parties.
Responsible - A responsible contractor is one that has adequate
financial resources, or the ability to secure such resources, is
able to comply with the required or proposed delivery or
performance schedule taking into account all existing business
commitments, has a satisfactory record of performance, integrity,
and business ethics; and is otherwise qualified and eligible to
receive an award under applicable laws and regulations.
Responsive - A responsive contractor is one whose bid complies in
all material respects with the invitation for bids. Such
compliance enables bidders to stand on an equal footing and
maintain the integrity of the contracting system.
Submittal - Literature that describes the technical aspects of the
materials or products the contractor plans to use for the contract.
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fraud and unethical con-
duct in the construction
industry.
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